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G. HEILEMAN BREWING CO. V. JOSEPH OAT CORP.:
EXPANDING RULE 16'S SCOPE TO COMPEL
REPRESENTED PARTIES WITH FULL SETTLEMENT
AUTHORITY TO ATTEND PRETRIAL CONFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

The first significant use of the pretrial conference in the Unitea States
took place in Michigan, in 1929.' Since then, two controversies regarding
the pretrial process have reigned. 2 One conflict involves the proper role of
pretrial conferences in litigation, the critical issue revolving around whether
pretrial conferences should aim chiefly to delineate issues and shape the case
for trial, or promote settlement.' The other controversy has served as "a
battleground of clashing 4philosophies about the proper role of the judge in
common law litigation."
The pretrial controversies became a procedural concern of the federal
courts in 1938 after the promulgation of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of

1. Oesterle, Trial Judges in Settlement Discussions: Mediators or Hagglers?, 9 CORNELL
L. FORUM 7 (1982).
2. M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 5-11 (1964). A third
dispute, which will not be specifically addressed here, is whether the pretrial process actually
works. For information regarding the effectiveness of pretrial conferences see id. at 12-15; THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, JUSTICE FOR ALL (1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]; T. CHURCH, JR.,

A.

CARLSON,

J. LEE,

& T.

TAN,

(1978) [hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED]; P.
(1983); S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT COURTS (1977); R. GILLESPIE, JUDICIAL

JUSTICE DELAYED

EBENER, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY
AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES
PRODUCTIVITY AND
COURTS

(1977); M.

COURT
SOLOMON

DELAY: AN

& D.

EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT

SOMERLOT, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT

(1987).
3. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 10. See also Comment, Pretrialin Maine Under New
Rule 16: Settlement, Sanctions, and Sayonara, 34 ME. L. REV. 111, 126-27 (1982) [hereinafter
Comment, Pretrial in Maine] (citing the dispute regarding the proper role of settlement in
pretrial procedure); Comment, Limits of JudicialAuthority in PretrialSettlement Under Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 OHIO ST. J. DIS. RES. 311, 322 (1987) [hereinafter
Comment, Limits of JudicialAuthority] (extent to which district courts can properly influence
settlement discussions is nowhere defined).
4. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 10. Professor Rosenberg further states, "[blecause the
pretrial conference confronts the judge with so many choices as to the intensity of his participation, and does so in an atmosphere less inhibited than at the trial itself, it is an unmatched
ground to test competing views as to the judge's due function in a civil litigation." Id. at 1011. See also Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
496 (1986) (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fail to address judges' proper role in shaping
settlements).
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Civil Procedure.' The Rule, among other things, provided for mandatory
pretrial conferences and was designed to provide federal judges with a means
to effectively manage their crowded dockets. 6 Although Rule 16 was viewed
as a success, it was substantially revised in 1983.1
The primary goal of the 1983 amendment was to promote active case
management by allowing courts to gain greater control over the pretrial
process and to facilitate settlement.' Moreover, Rule 16 advocates a more
active judicial role in all aspects of the litigation process. 9 Thus, the 1983
amendment to Rule 16 officially marked the end of an era. No longer would
judges be perceived as passive adjudicators or umpires. Rather, Rule 16
catapults each federal district court judge into the role of an active case
manager. 10
Despite the fact that the drafters clearly advocated the facilitation of
settlement and a more active judicial role, the 1983 amendment did not put
an end to the pretrial controversies. Arguably, however, the debate has
become more refined. The concern no longer focuses on whether settlement
should be an objective of pretrial litigation or whether judges should take
an active managerial role; instead, the controversy now focuses on the proper
interpretation and scope of Rule 16. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph

5. Rule 16 as originally promulgated in 1938 provided in pertinent part:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings
to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
.... The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar on which
actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either confine
the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all actions.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 16, reprinted in M. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 214.
6. In an act of desperation, the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan established a
system of compulsory pretrial conferences to manage its congested civil calendar, which was
forty-five months in arrears. The process appeared to succeed in reducing docket congestion.
Thus, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted a similar procedure in 1938
as Rule 16. See Oesterle, supra note 1,at 7.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Introduction).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (a)(2), (5); id. 16 (c)(7).
9. FED R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Pretrial Conferences; Objectives).
10. For conflicting views on managerial judging compare Elliott, Managerial Judging and
the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 307-08 (1986) (the evolution of managerial
judging illustrates the law adapting existing structures to perform new functions which developed
in response to a fundamental design flaw in the federal rules) with Resnik, ManagerialJudges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 (1982) (managerial judging is new form of judicial activism that
gives trial courts more authority and simultaneously provides litigants with fewer procedural
safeguards against abuse of judicial authority).
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Oat Corp.,I directly addresses this new pretrial controversy. The case attempts to define Rule 16's proper scope in terms of the judicial promotion
of pretrial settlement and, more generally, managerial judging.
In Heileman, the Seventh Circuit held that district courts retain the
authority to "order litigants [who are] represented by counsel to attend
pretrial conferences" and to have "full settlement authority" to discuss
settlement.' The Seventh Circuit reasoned that such an exercise constituted
a valid use of courts' inherent power and furthered Rule 16's spirit and
intent. '"

The Seventh Circuit's decision is significant because it requires represented
parties to be actively involved in pretrial settlement negotiations before a
judge or magistrate. The decision is also significant because it lends a broad
interpretation to the determination of a judge's proper role in the newly
established procedural universe of "active judicial management." The Seventh Circuit's legal analysis is also important because the majority transcended Rule 16's language and the Advisory Committee's Note in reaching
its decision and relied instead on district courts' inherent power to control
and manage their dockets.
This Note will analyze the Seventh Circuit's decision and legal analysis.
It will begin with an overview of the relevant federal rules of civil procedure,
courts' inherent power, and pertinent case law. The Note will then attempt
to demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit inappropriately ignored the plain
language of Rule 16. Further, the Note will illustrate that the majority's
articulation and reliance on courts' inherent authority fails to support its
holding and indeed is inconsistent with Rule 16's underlying objectives.
Finally, the Note attempts to offer an alternative holding that better addresses
the policy concerns identified by the majority, and examines some of the
questions left unanswered in Heileman.
I.

BACKGROUND

Heileman ultimately turns on the interpretation of Rule 16 and federal
courts' inherent power. The decision, however, also involves Rules 1 and 83
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 requires district courts to
construe liberally the federal rules in order to achieve a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action. Rule 16, which is essential in
fostering Rule l's mandate, regulates the substantive aspects of pretrial
activities in the federal courts. District courts can, however, rely on local
rules in addition to Rule 16, in governing pretrial matters. Moreover, Rule
83 provides district courts with the authority to promulgate these local rules.14

11. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
12. Id. at 656.
13. Id.652-53.
14. Additionally, Rule 16(b) expressly mandates that judges be cognizant of local rules. It
provides, in part, that "[eixcept in categories of actions exempted by district court rule as
inappropriate . . . the judge . . . shall . . . enter a scheduling order." FED. R. Crv. P. 16(b).
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While the Heileman decision implicates each of these rules, the Seventh
Circuit ultimately relied on courts' inherent power to justify its holding.
Although the existence of courts' inherent authority is irrefutable, it is an
elusive, ambiguous legal doctrine, the exact scope of which is still undefined.' 5
A.
1.

The Rules: 1, 16, 83

Rule 1

Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 states that the federal
rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' 7 In addition to providing federal courts with a
basic guideline of construction when applying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 8 Rule 1 mandates that these courts construe the rules liberally
to advance justice, even if in derogation of the common law.' 9 Thus, the
federal rules should facilitate, rather than inhibit, the just resolution of

15. Judge Crastley, in his book Inherent Powers of the Courts, cites a "working definition"
of inherent power as "all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently
its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful
actions effective." J. CRASTLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS vi (1980).
16. In 1935, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee to draft the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity
and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935). The Rules were promulgated pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act, which provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the
district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The Rules became effective on September 16, 1938. See Rules of Civil
Procedure, 308 U.S. 645, 766 (1938).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule I is entitled "Scope of Rules" and provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of
a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with
the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.
Id.
18. 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
1.1311]
(1989) [hereinafter 2 MOORE's]. One judge, commenting on Rule l's importance, stated that
"[there is probably no more elementary mandate under the Federal Rules than that set forth
in the second sentence of Rule 1. The rules have for their primary purpose the securing of
speedy and inexpensive justice in a uniform and well ordered manner." Davis v. Synhorst, 217
F. Supp. 492, 509 (S.D. Iowa 1963) (McManus, J.,dissenting).
19. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (1977) [hereinafter 4 WRIGHT & MILLER]. Cf.Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947) (discovery rules
should be liberally construed so as not to reach a harsh and unwarranted result).

1990]

G. HEILMAN, INC. v. JOSEPH OAT CORP.

935

disputes 20 and the outcome of cases should turn on their merits rather than

21
on technical issues of pleading and procedure.
While the federal rules provide procedural guidance and instruction, 22 they
give only general direction to litigants. Commentators have stated that the
keystone to the effective functioning of the federal rules lies with the trial
courts' discretion. 23 Rule 1, through its goal of a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of litigation, serves as a broad foundation for courts'
consideration of all federal procedural
matters and exemplifies the discre24
tionary nature of the federal rules.
Federal courts, however, do not have unlimited power to interpret the
federal rules. Rather, they must adhere to a rule's plain meaning. 25 Furthermore, in interpreting the rules, the Supreme Court has found the Advisory
Committee's Notes to be persuasive.2 6 The committee notes, while not conclusive, are analogous to legislative history. 27 Finally, each federal rule 2should
be interpreted in light of its relation to the larger procedural system. 1

20. See 2 MooRE's, supra note 18, at
1.13[1]. See also Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) ("The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice
through fair trials, not through summary dismissals ....
If rules of procedure work as they
should . . . they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide
complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits."); Hormell v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552,
557 (1941) ("Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not
to defeat them ....
Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of
fundamental justice.").
21. 2 MooRE's, supra note 18, at 1.13[l]; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962)
("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading
is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.") (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957)). Cf. Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1971) (court permitted witness to
testify even though not listed in pretrial order); FED. R. Civ. P. 61 ("The court at every stage
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.").
22. See 2 MOORE'S, supra note 18, at
1.31[1].
23. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, at § 1029 (trial judges' failure to exercise discretion
intelligently on case-by-case basis will have a debilitating effect on entire federal judicial system);
Davis, 448 F.2d at 921 (quality of justice will prevail only if district courts apply federal rules
with intelligent flexibility).
24. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, at § 1029.
25. Guilford National Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 925 (4th Cir. 1962) (although
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed, courts cannot disregard plainly
expressed limitations).
26. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946) (committee's
construction of rules is "of weight" in ascertaining their meaning). See also United States v.
720 Bottles Labeled 2 Fl. Oz. * * * Plantation Pure Vanilla Extract, 3 F.R.D. 466, 467
(E.D.N.Y. 1944) (drafters' statements must be accorded great respect); 2 MOORE'S, supra note
18, at 1.13[2] (advisory notes are persuasive and drafters entitled to respect accorded impartial
experts).
27. 2 MOORE'S, supra note 18, at 1.13[2].
28. United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1962) (each federal rule must
be construed as being related to the general plan of other federal procedural rules).
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Rule 16

To a great extent, the length of the pretrial process and the actions taken
by the parties and judge during the pretrial process will determine whether
a resolution is considered to be "just, speedy, [or] inexpensive." Rule 16
plays an important role in furthering Rule l's mandate 29 and regulates the
substantive facets of pretrial procedure.
The settlement of cases has never been an explicit objective of the traditional pretrial conference. 0 The original drafters of Rule 16 intended settlement to be only a natural by-product of the pretrial process. 3' Justice Clark
further explained the drafters' omission:
This omission was, however, deliberate, even though such settlements are
often the substantial by-product of pre-trial. But it has been felt, and
experience supports this, that settlement will come naturally in many cases
as the issues are defined and made clear and simple. On the other hand,
it is dangerous to the whole purpose of pre-trial to force settlement upon
unwilling parties and to make the conference the recognized instrument of
compelled negotiations. Pre-trial used as a club to force settlements will
destroy its utility as a stage of the trial process itself and will pretty surely
lead to its elimination as its potentialities for unfairness become more
32
apparent to litigants and their counsel.

Both courts and scholars have articulated this traditional notion of pretrial
practice.33 Nevertheless, even though the traditional pretrial conference was

29. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. M/T Gilda, 790 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[a] party
need not offer proof as to matters not contested in the pretrial-order" because such a holding
would "not be consonant" with Rule l's mandate); Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 459 F.2d 138, 150 (6th Cir. 1972) ("[Flormal pretrial orders ... could have
substantially reduced the time required to try the case and might well have eliminated some of
the time-consuming testimony which was irrelevant").
30. Clark, Objectives of Pre- Trial Procedures, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 167 (1956) (the primary
purpose of the original Rule was to define claims and defenses of parties for the purpose of
eliminating unnecessary proof and issues). See also Wallin v. Fuller, 476 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th
Cir. 1973) ("The pretrial conference serves the purposes of expediting litigation and eliminating
surprises at trial.").
31. See Clark, supra note 30, at 167 (Justice Clark was reporter to the original advisory
committee). See also Comment, Limits of Judicial Authority, supra note 3, at 311 (settlement
discussions were viewed as a natural by-product of traditional pretrial conferences).
32. Clark, supra note 30, at 167 (footnote omitted).
33. See, e.g., FDIC v. Glickman, 450 F.2d 416, 419 (9th Cir. 1971) (Rule 16's purpose is
"to simplify the issues, amend the pleadings where necessary, and to avoid unnecessary proof
of facts at the trial.") (quotifig McDonald v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 741, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1945));
Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1961) (Rule 16 "calls for a conference
of counsel with the court to prepare for, not to avert, trial.") (emphasis in original); Brennan,
PretrialProcedurein New Jersey-aDemonstration, 28 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 442, 449 (1956) ("[Tlhe
overriding, primary, almost exclusive function of the pretrial conference is to further the
disposition of the cases according to right and justice on the merits."), reprinted in M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 7; Handbook for Effective Pretrial Procedure, reprinted in 37
F.R.D. 255, 271 (1964) ("[l~t should never be forgotten that settlement is merely a by-product
of the pretrial conference and not its prime purpose.").
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deemed a general success,3 4 it was completely revised in 1983 to facilitate
pretrial management and to meet the "needs of modern litigation." 35
The 1983 drafters desired to make case management an express goal of
pretrial procedure.16 Thus, they shifted the emphasis away from the traditional pretrial conferences, which focused solely on the trial, towards a
process of judicial management that embraced the entire pretrial phase.37
Judicial management was deemed necessary because it had become commonplace for attorneys to abuse the pretrial process.3 8 The drafters, therefore,
34. The drafters stated that pretrial conferences improved the quality of justice rendered at
trial by sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases, which seemingly eliminated trial
surprise, and improved, as well as facilitated the settlement process. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory
committee's note (Introduction).
35. Id. A criticism of the original Rule 16 was that it often resulted in over-regulation of
the "simple run-of-the-mill" cases and under-administration, due to its highly discretionary
character, of complex cases. Id. See also Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The
New Role.in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 774 (1981)
(enumerating "crucial issues" not addressed by original Rule 16).
36. Rule 16(a) currently states, in pertinent part:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before
it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action ...and[ 1
(5) facilitating the settlement of the caseFED.

R. Civ. P. 16 (a).

37. FED R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Pretrial Conferences; Objectives). The
original Rule 16 made the impending trial the focus of pretrial activity and provided courts
with the authority to compel attorneys to appear before them to consider the available means
to expedite resolution of the dispute. See supra note 5 (Rule 16 as originally promulgated in
1938). Some of the rule's objectives included simplifying the issues, amending the pleadings,
and limiting the number of expert witnesses. The 1983 drafters thought these somewhat limited
objectives inadequate tools for purposes of case management. FED. R. CIv. P. 16, advisory
committee's note (Introduction). Therefore, they broadened the scope of Rule 16's objectives
by allowing courts, in part, to establish early control of the case to properly manage its
disposition, to discourage wasteful pretrial activities, and to facilitate settlement. FED. R. Civ.
P. 16(a). The drafters also expanded the list of items that may be discussed at the pretrial
conference. Id. at 16(c).
Perhaps the greatest advancement towards a pretrial conference that "embraced the entire
pretrial phase" was the addition of 16(b), which provides for a mandatory scheduling order.
This significant change encourages early judicial involvement in case management. See J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE

1990

RULES PAMPHLET

16.2[4] (1990). Unlike the original Rule 16 which

made no reference to a scheduling order and left scheduling to the litigants, the amended Rule
16 requires courts to issue, within 120 days after the suit is filed, a scheduling order that
articulates a timetable for joining other parties, amending pleadings, filing and hearing motions,
and completing discovery. FED. R. Cirv. P. 16 (b). In this way, the 1983 drafters provided
courts with the responsibility and authority to control the length of the pretrial process.
38. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (attorney abuse of discovery process); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)
(attorney's failure to appear at pretrial conference after history of other abuses); Admiral
Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978) (attorney violation of
pretrial order). Cf. Elliott, supra note 10, at 309-10 ("Advocates of managerial judging . ..
say [the existing procedural regime] necessarily fails to achieve its self-proclaimed goal of 'the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of controversies if left to its own devices.").
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displaced attorney control over the pretrial process and replaced it with
judicial control in order to further the efficiency and integrity of the judicial
process. Even though district court judges now have the authority to determine the length of the pretrial process and when and how quickly cases are
40
to be tried,3 9 the specific techniques of the individual judges vary.
In addition to making settlement an express objective of the pretrial
process, Rule 16(a) also differs from the original Rule 16 in that the 1983
drafters provided district courts with the authority to compel "unrepresented
parties" to attend pretrial conferences. 4' While Rule 16 appears to make a
consistent distinction between represented and unrepresented parties, 42 the
drafters did not explicitly provide district courts with the authority to compel
"represented parties" to attend pretrial conferences.
Rule 16(c) expanded the list of items43 which could be discussed at a
pretrial conference to encourage better planning and management of litigation

39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Rule 16 advocates "judicial management that embraces the
entire pretrial phase." FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Pretrial Conferences;
Objectives). See also Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400, 402 (1978) (case management encourages judges to "intervene in civil litigation
and take an appropriately active part in its management from the beginning"); JUSTICE DELAYED,
supra note 2, at 39 (objective of case management is "the assumption of court responsibility
for both the pace and the substantive progress of the pretrial stage of civil litigation"); Cf.
Elliott, supra note 10, at 309 ("Managerial judges believe that the system does not work; that
something must be done to make it work; and that the only plausible solution to the problem
is ad hoc procedural activism by judges. ") (emphasis in original).
40. See Elliott, supra note 10, at 309. Compare Costantino, Judges as Case Managers, 17
TRIAL 56, 58 (Mar. 1981) (informal status conferences, sometimes off the record) and Krupansky,
The Federal Rules are Alive and Well, 4 LITIGATION 10, 12-13 (Fall 1977) (formal pretrial
conferences in court and on the record) and Richey, A Federal Trial Judge's Reflections on
the Preparationfor and Trial of Civil Cases, 52 IND. L.J. 111, 112-14 (1976) (explaining use
of pleadings and pretrial filings).
41. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (original Rule 16 stated that "the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference") with FED. R. CIv.
P. 16(a) (amended Rule 16 states that "the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference") (emphasis
added).
42. In addition to Rule 16 (a), Rules 16(b), (c), and (d) all distinguish between represented
and unrepresented parties. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (requires judge to "consult[] with
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties") (emphasis added) and id. 16(c)
("[alt least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference") (emphasis
added) and id. 16(d) (final pretrial conference "shall be attended by at least one of the attorneys
* . . and by any unrepresentedparties") (emphasis added) with id. 16(f) (distinction less clear:
[i]f a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no appearance
is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference") (emphasis added).
43. Rule 16(c) states, in part:
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination
of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

1990]

G. HEILMAN, INC. v. JOSEPH OAT CORP.

939

and thereby accelerate the processing and termination of cases. 44 Recognizing
that discussion of settlement at pretrial conferences had become commonplace, 45 the drafters indicated that "settlement should be facilitated at as
early a stage of the litigation as possible." ' 46 The drafters, however, admonished that Rule 16 was not intended to "impose settlement negotiations on
designed to provide a neutral forum
unwilling litigants," but was instead
47
which might foster settlement.

(3) the possibility of obtaining admission of fact and of documents which will
avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and
advance rulings from the court on the admissibility of evidence;
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence;
(5) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need and schedule for
filing and exchanging pretrial briefs, and the date or dates for further conference
and for trial;
(6) the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master;
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute;
(8) the form and substance of the pretrial order;
(9) the disposition of pending motions;
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult
or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult
legal question, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences). The 1983 drafters thought the 1938 version's litany of items that courts could
consider during pretrial conferences too narrow. Therefore, the 1983 drafters added other items
which courts could specifically consider at pretrial conferences. Three of the more significant
additions include discussing the possibility of settlement, advocating the use of extrajudicial
procedures to resolve the dispute, and adopting special procedures for managing complex
litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7), (10).
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Pretrial Conferences; Objectives). Judge
Peckham, in an article that pre-dated the 1983 amendments, stated, "[w]hile few judges wish
to force unwilling parties to settle, many judges believe that the promotion of informed and
fair settlements is one of the most important aims of pretrial management." Peckham, supra
note 35, at 773.
46. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences).
47. Id. The drafters indicated that the second phrase of (c)(7)-regarding courts exploring
the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve disputes-includes urging the litigants to
employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse. Id. These alternative techniques include
summary jury trials, arbitration, mini-trials, and mediation. For more information on the use
of these techniques see Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64
(1983); Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, 9 LITIGATION 12 (1982); Lambros, Summary Jury
Trial, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 139 (1987); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial And
Other Methods Of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 366 (1986); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982). See also
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 901-907, 102 Stat.
4642, 4659-64 (1988) (making arbitration an experimental pretrial technique in certain civil
actions in specified districts where relief sought does not exceed $100,000).
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The 1983 drafters added the last sentence of 16(c) 48 to Rule 16 to prevent
pretrial conferences from becoming mere "ceremonial or ritualistic
event[s]. . . .The reference to authority [however] is not intended to insist
upon the ability to settle the litigation." '49 The drafters warned that the rule
should not:
[B]e read to encourage the judge conducting the conference to compel
attorneys to enter into stipulations or to make admissions that they consider
to be unreasonable, that touch on matters that could not normally have
been anticipated to arise at the conference, or on subjects of a dimension
that normally require prior consultation with and approval from the
client.5 0
This statement expressly acknowledges that Rule 16 was designed neither to
require pretrial participants to have settlement authority5' nor to encourage
judges to unduly coerce counsel.52
A final addition to Rule 16 involved courts' discretion to impose sanctions.53 The rationale underlying this addition was twofold: (1) to reflect
existing practice5 4; and (2) to obviate courts' reliance on Rule 41(b)55 or their
inherent authority to justify the imposition of sanctions. 6

48. The sentence states: "[a]t least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any
conference before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions
regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed." FED.
R. Civ. P. 16 (c).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences).
50. Id.
51. See 3 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
16.16.1 (1989).
52. Id. at
16.16.1. See also Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985) (courts
cannot coerce settlement).
53. Rule 16(f) provides, in part:
If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or
if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the
judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard
thereto as are just .... In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge
shall require the party or the attorney representing the party or both to pay the
reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including
attorney's fees ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Sanctions).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) states, in pertinent part: "[flor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or any claim against the defendant." Id.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Sanctions). Sanctions have been imposed
and upheld in numerous cases. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (sanction
for attorney's failure to attend a pretrial conference); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1988) (same); Price v. McGlathery, 792 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Smith v. Rowe, 761
F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1985) (sanction for attorney's willful noncompliance with court's orders);
Flaherty v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 109 F.R.D. 617 (D. Mass. 1986) (sanction for attorney's
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Both Rules 1 and 16, represent an expression on the drafters' part to
uphold judicial efficiency and integrity. The drafters displaced attorney
control over the pretrial process and required the courts to engage in active
case management. The drafters also desired courts to provide a neutral
forum for settlement discussions. Nevertheless, settlement negotiations must
not be imposed on unwilling litigants. Lastly, the drafters provided sanctions
for abuse of the pretrial process.
3.

Rule 83

Rule 16 operates in conjunction with Rule 83,11 which provides district8
courts with the means to promulgate local rules regarding pretrial procedure.
Nevertheless, the original drafters expected district courts to make local rules
only on rare occasions.5 9 Specifically, local rules were supposed to fill gaps
deliberately left by the drafters in the federal rules 60 to allow courts to govern
in instances where the subject matter was too variant or of unique local
concern. 6' Thus, Rule 83, as promulgated, provided judges a means to decide
62
unusual or minor procedural problems.
Rule 83 also grants district judges two distinct powers: one a "rulemaking"
power, the other a "decisionmaking" power. 63 Rule 83 was amended for the
inability to meaningfully participate and answer questions during pretrial conference); EEOC
v. American Automobile Ass'n, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 999 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (sanction
for failure to file a pretrial stipulation prior to conference).
57. Originally promulgated in 1938, Rule 83 provides, in pertinent part:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to
time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make
and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. . . . In all
cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 83.
Judge Peckham has stated, "[t]his simple grant of authority has generated astonishingly
disuniform rules of pretrial procedure." Peckham, supra note 35, at 776. See, e.g., C.D. Cal.
R. 9.4.11 ("The parties shall exhaust all possibilities of settlement."); D. Kan. R. 214 ("The
settlement conference shall be conducted in such a way as to permit an informal discussion
between counsel, the parties, and the judge, magistrate or attorney"); D. Md. R. 106(1) ("A
pretrial order must be submitted in all cases except"); E.D. Mich. R. 21(c) ("Each party shall
be represented . . . by at least one attorney who . . . shall be possessed of information and
authority adequate . . . for all purposes, including settlement."); E.D. Okla. R. 17(b)(2)
("Litigants will not attend the conference without prior Court approval."); N.D. Okla. R. 17.1
("A person or representative with full settlement authority shall accompany the attorney to the
settlement conference.").
58. See Peckham, supra note 35, at 774.
59. Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1255 (1967).
60. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, at § 3152. The drafters believed such gaps were
few and such situations were rare or relatively unimportant. The drafters felt that such situations
should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, in accordance with general principles of justice and
common sense. Note, supra note 59, at 1255.
61. Note, supra note 59, at 1255.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1252.
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first time in 198564 to respond to critics who questioned the soundness of

the local rulemaking process, as well as the validity of some local rules. 65
The amendment attempted to enhance the local rulemaking process by

requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to
comment on them. 66 However, the success of the 1985 amendment has been
recently questioned by Congress. 67
Courts' authority to promulgate local rules pursuant to Rule 83, however,

is not unlimited. Rule 83's text prohibits local rules that are inconsistent

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 61 Moreover, local rules must be
consistent with the Constitution or any congressional enactments. 69 The

Supreme Court has also stated that the nature of the local rulemaking process
itself restricts the promulgation of local rules. 7° Thus, federal courts cannot

64. FED. R. Civ. P. 83, advisory committee's note.
65. Id. For example, one critic of Rule 83 wrote:
[T~he majority of district courts have, in promulgating rules, ignored the principles
of simplicity, scarcity and uniformity which guided the formulation of the Federal
Rules. At times, district courts have used their power under Rule 83 to negate
specific requirements of the Federal Rules; more often Rule 83 was used to escape
from the arduous but essential task of case-by-case analysis.
Note, supra note 59, at 1251-52 (footnotes omitted).
Another critic stated: "This power, though hedged with limitations, has been the imprimatur
for a plethora of individualized rules which have generally remained unchallenged and untested
by subjection to the comprehensive scrutiny of judicial decision or scholarly inquiry." Comment,
The Local Rules of Civil Procedurein the FederalDistrict Courts-A Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J.
1011, 1011-12 (footnotes omitted).
Further, the strong interest in developing a uniform federal procedure was thought to be
seriously compromised by the proliferation of local rules. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
19, at § 3152. Although many local rules, perhaps promulgated by a good faith belief that they
would promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of cases, were "either invalid
on their face or intruded unwisely into areas that should have been dealt with on a national
basis by the Supreme Court." Id. Cf. Kahn, Local PretrialProcedures Rules in the Federal
Courts, 6 LITIGATION 34 (Spring 1980) (attorneys concerned that judges use burdensome pretrial
local rules as wedge for settlement not for issue simplification).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note.
67. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 402-403,
102 Stat. 4642, 4650-51 (1988) (Congress enacts more detailed procedures, notice requirements,
and supervision by the Judicial Conference over the local rulemaking process).
68. FED. R. CIv. P. 83. See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 1976) (court
invalidated local rule requiring counsel to "confer and ... meaningfully and effectively express
and commit themselves in a written statement on matters and issues involved in ... the action"
because it distorted purpose of Rule 16). Cf. Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548-49
(2d Cir. 1961) (pretrial orders given to litigants by trial judge pursuant to Rule 16 held improper
because at odds with purpose and intent of federal rules).
69. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, at § 3151.
70. Id. The difference between the national and the local rulemaking processes has been
explained as follows:
When the Civil Rules are amended, the process is extremely careful. The Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules includes lawyers, judges, and scholars with a national
reputation for their expertness on matters of procedure, and it is assisted by a
scholar of rank who acts as its Reporter. When it has agreed on a preliminary draft
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promulgate local rules that function as "basic' ' 7 procedural rules in that
they may possibly be deemed to interfere with the litigants' substantive rights
by affecting the ultimate outcome of litigation.
On its face, Rule 83 appears to give district courts a great deal of discretion
in promulgating local rules; as a result numerous and extensive local rules
exist. One court, however, has warned that, "local rules are not a source of
power but are instead a manifestation of it. ' 72 Moreover, Rule 83's drafters,
73
Congress, and critics have warned against the proliferation of local rules.
In sum, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 16, and 83 represent important
rules for purposes of pretrial activity. Rule 1 provides a foundation upon
which the federal rules are premised and mandates the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination" of disputes. Rule 16 directly addresses pretrial
conferences and activities, and Rule 83 provides a means for district courts
to regulate pretrial activity through the promulgation of local rules. While
these rules play an important role in shaping courts' authority, they do not
provide the sole source from which courts' powers emanate.
B. Inherent Power of the Federal Courts
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct courts in administering
their duties, these rules do not completely describe or limit district courts'
power. 74 Indeed, it is an undisputed fact that district courts have inherent
powers upon which they may rely in their resolution of cases. 75 What is
disputed, however, is the exact scope of this inherent authority, which has

of amendments, thousands of copies of that draft are sent out to the profession.
Many comments on the draft, and suggestions for improvement in it, then come
back to the committee from bar association committees, individual lawyers and
scholars, and in law review commentary. The draft is reevaluated and refined in
the light of these comments. When the Advisory Committee has completed its work,
the amendments still must be approved by the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, by the Judicial Conference of the United States, and by
the Supreme Court, and Congress retains the power, though it never has exercised
it, to disapprove the amendments. The process is calculated to ensure that any
changes reflect the best thinking of the entire profession.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
71. Compare Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1960) (local rule authorizing depositions
in admiralty cases invalid because subject was weighty, complex and of "great importance to
litigants") and 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, at § 3152 (local rulemaking process is not
suited for complex and controversial subjects) with Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64
(1973) (local rule providing for a six person jury found not to be "basic procedural innovation"
and thus consistent with Rule 48).
72. McCargo, 545 F.2d at 402.
73. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
74. Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986).
75. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d. 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). The court
stated that these inherent powers were those vested in the courts upon their creation and not
derived from any statute. Id.
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been described as nebulous, and its bounds as "shadowy.

'76

While courts

historically 77

have
relied on their inherent powers, no express test for determining the validity of such use exists. Three general formulations, however,
have emerged. Two approaches attempt to categorize courts' various uses of
their inherent power. A third approach separates the inherent power inquiry
into a two-part analysis that focuses on precedent and litigants' rights.
Common to all of these articulations is the recognition that numerous
limitations restrict courts' inherent authority.
1. Third Circuit's View
The Third Circuit articulated an approach to the inherent power inquiry
that focused on courts' use of their inherent power. 71 It recognized that "the
term inherent power has been employed in three general fashions" and
labeled them as irreducible inherent authority, functionally necessary authority and functionally useful authority. 79
. The court identified the first use of inherent power, irreducible inherent
authority, as encompassing "an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional
tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is

76. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 485
(1958). For a "working definition" of inherent authority see supra note 15.
77. See Eash, 757 F.2d at 561. Past uses of inherent power include the use of contempt
sanctions to regulate the conduct of the members of the bar. See Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925). Other scenarios involving courts' use of inherent power include: Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 380 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (inherent power exists to grant
changes of venue and to impose restrictions on press coverage) (dicta); Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 343-46 (1970) (inherent power to regulate courtroom decorum and thereby remove
disruptive defendant); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 355-56 (1871) (inherent power used to
disbar attorney); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1974) (inherent power to
issue protective order to ensure fair trial); Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558, 561 (7th Cir.
1970) (inherent power to prohibit courtroom photography); Reid v. Prentice Hall, Inc, 261
F.2d 700, 701 (6th Cir. 1958) (inherent power to punish abuse of its process by dismissal of
an action); Wells v. Gilliam, 196 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Va. 1961) (judge retains control of
the courtroom and the conduct of those in it).
78. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). For an analysis
of the Eash decision see Note, Settling a Case: A Court's Inherent Power To Impose Sanctions
Before and After Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 539 (1986).
79. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-63. Cf. Note, Civil Procedure-Powerof Federal Courts to
Discipline Attorneys for Delay in Pre-TrialProcedure, 38 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 158, 162 (1963).
The article recognized three uses of inherent power:
(1) as such powers as result from the very nature of a court's organization and are
essential to its existence and protection and to the due administration of justice;
(2) as such power as is essential to the existence, dignity and functions of a court
from the very fact that it is a court; and (3) as such powers as are necessary to the
orderly and efficient exercise of jurisdiction.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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really to render practically meaningless the terms 'court' and 'judicial
power." ' '80 The irreducible inherent authority of courts arose from the judicial

powers vested in the federal judiciary pursuant to article III of the Constitution after Congress "created lower federal courts and demarcated their
jurisdiction."'" In Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., the Third Circuit recognized that courts must exercise their irreducible inherent authority with great
restraint and caution because the "[bloundaries
locate with exactitude. "s';

. . . are not possible to

The Third Circuit also identified a second, more common type of inherent
power used by courts: "powers implied from strict functional necessity." 3
This use of inherent power was thought to arise from the nature of the

court, but was "more often thought to be the power[] 'necessary to the
exercise of all others.'' ' 4 Its uses include the authority to supervise and
discipline the conduct of attorneys as court officers, the most prominent
example being the contempt sanction. 5 Although the legislature may regulate
the exercise of this inherent power "within limits not precisely defined," '86
this functionally necessary authority can "neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative" 8 because of the important role it plays in the
functioning of the courts.

The Third Circuit identified a "third' form of authority subsumed under
the general term inherent power [which implicates] powers necessary only in
the practical sense of being useful." 88 This functionally useful inherent power

80. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 (citing Levin & Amerstdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem of Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1958)). The
court pointed to various examples of this power, including: instances in which courts voided
legislation requiring a written opinion in every case, Vaughan v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160, 4 S.W.
751 (1887); declaring within what time every case must be heard, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v.
Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 P. 486 (1926); and, denying a court the power to issue its mandate
until a prescribed period of time after the judgment elapsed. Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 263,
118 S.W.2d 547 (1938). Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 n.7.
81. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. Irreducible inherent authority is "grounded in the separation of
powers concept, because to deny this power 'and yet to conceive of courts is a self-contradiction."' Id. (quoting Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv.
1010, 1023 (1924)).
82. Id. at 562.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Historically, the contempt power has been noted as "essential to the administration
of justice," Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924), and "absolutely essential"
for the functioning of the judiciary. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1959).
86. Eash 757 F.2d at 563.
87. Id. (quoting Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66). See also DeKrasner v. Boykin, 54 Ga. App.
29, 35-36, 186 S.E. 701, 704 (1936) (legislature can aid courts with laws but courts have the
right to disregard unreasonable statutory regulations).
88. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563. The Third Circuit pointed to Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300
(1920), as an example of this power. There, the Supreme Court held that district courts possessed
the inherent power to supply themselves with an "auditor" to aid in decisionmaking. Id. at
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89
can only be exercised in "the absence of contrary legislative direction."
Thus, "[elven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory [or inherent]

power . .. is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions. - 90
2.

Two Alternative Views

A second approach 9t to courts' inherent powers also segregates courts' use
of their authority into three classifications: (1) the power to procure buildings,
supplies, and personnel, including the power to call upon citizens to serve
their public duty as witnesses; (2) the power to make rules for the judicial
system, including those governing practice and procedure, the unauthorized
practice of law, and decorum; and, (3) the power to hold persons in
contempt. 92 This view also articulates three limitations on courts' use of their
inherent power. First, courts may use their inherent power only when "reasonably necessary" to function. 93 Second, courts may employ their inherent

312. The Eash court found this to be an example of courts' functionally useful inherent power,
reasoning that "it is clear that such power is necessary only in the sense of being highly useful
in the pursuit of a just result." Eash, 757 F.2d at 563.
Interestingly, in Peterson, the Supreme Court appeared to be using a functional necessity
standard, stating that such authority was necessary to enable courts to process litigation to a
just and equitable conclusion. However, the Eash court believed otherwise.
89. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563.
90. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985). The Thomas Court further stated that a
contrary result "would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered
limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing." Id. (quoting United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727, 737 (1980)).
The exact meaning of this restriction, however, is not entirely clear. For example, the Seventh
Circuit has articulated two different standards for determining whether a use of inherent power
is contrary to or inconsistent with legislative direction. In Soo Line R.R. v. Escanaba, 840 F.2d
546 (7th Cir. 1988), the court stated that inherent authority is merely another name for the
power of courts to make common law when statutes and rules do not address a particular
topic. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). But this restriction appeared to be narrowed in Landau &
Clearly, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1989). There, although the court
recognized that inherent authority may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it rearticulated this to mean that "where the rules directly
mandate a specific procedure to the exclusion of others, inherent authority is proscribed." Id.
at 1002 (emphasis added).
91. See Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the Courts,
87 YALE L.J. 342 (1977).
92. Id. at 350.
93. Id. at 351. The test for "reasonable necessity" under the rulemaking category is twofold:
(1) whether the inherent rule is necessary for efficient judicial proceedings; and (2) whether the
need for the rule of practice and procedure "is apparent and pressing." Id. at 353. Whether
the need for the use of inherent power is "apparent and pressing" is important because courts
should only "sparingly" use their inherent powers to create new rules of practice and procedure.
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powers only to control internal activities of the judicial system. 94 Third,

courts' inherent powers may not be used in violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. 95

A third and final approach to courts' use of their inherent authority
articulates two general considerations. 96 First, before invoking their inherent
power, courts should consider whether similar uses have been historically

upheld. 97 Second, courts should carefully consider the effect to which the
purported use of inherent power would have on litigants' rights98 and ask
"how close to deeply held rights and privileges of others does the proposed
rule or order run?" 99 This second consideration can prevent an unduly
expansive interpretation of the inherent power doctrine. Along these same
lines, the Supreme Court has expressed concern with respect to the expansion
of the courts' inherent power, stating that "[b]ecause inherent powers are
shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint
and discretion."00

In sum, courts traditionally have used their inherent powers without
articulating an explicit or practically functional test. Instead, courts have
focused on the limitations on the use of their inherent power. While numerous
limitations exist, the most articulated limitation is that the use of inherent
power must be consistent with congressional legislation and the Constitution.
Another limitation is that courts must use their inherent power sparingly,
with great discretion, and only when necessary. Additionally, courts may
only exercise their inherent powers over activities and persons within the

94. Id. at 351. This restriction limits the exercise of inherent powers to activities and persons
within the judicial system. In the rulemaking category, this limitation means that inherent rules
regarding practice, procedure, and courtroom decorum should only regulate the activities of
persons involved in a particular case before the court. Id. at 358-59. See also J. CRASTLEY,
supra note 15, at 49. Cf. Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 1944)
(power to appoint special master unavailable without pending litigation).
95. Note, supra note 91, at 353. In terms of the rulemaking category, the separation of
powers doctrine limitation prevents the executive or legislative branches from attempting to
regulate how cases should be heard or decided. Id. at 363. Likewise, the judiciary must not
usurp the roles of the legislative or executive branch. For instance, a court could not compel
a United States Attorney to sign an indictment. Id. See also J. CRASTLEY, supra note 15, at
49.
96. See Comment, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to Order

Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57

FORDHAM

L.

REV.

483, 497 (1988); J.

CRASTLEY,

supra

note 15, at 16.
97. Id. Alternatively under this first consideration, courts should determine whether the
prospective use of the inherent power can reasonably be viewed as a logical extension of prior
accepted uses. See J. CRASTLEY, supra note 15, at 16.
98. See Comment, supra note 96, at 496.
99. See J. CRASTLEY, supra note 15, at 16.
100. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). See also Frankfurter &
Landis, supra note 81, at 1022-23 ("The accumulated weight of repetition behind such a phrase
as 'inherent powers' of the lower Federal courts is a constant invitation to think words instead
of things. It is imperative, therefore, to subject it to critical scrutiny.").
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judicial system. Lastly, a court may only exercise its inherent power in a
manner consistent with the separation of powers doctrine.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 1 and 16, do not
completely limit district courts' power. Rather, district courts have the means
to promulgate procedural rules through Rule 83 and the inherent power
doctrine. Promulgation of local rules, pursuant to Rule 83, is limited by the
rule's language and the process by which such rules are passed. Similarly,
promulgation of procedural rules, pursuant to courts' inherent authority, is
closely scrutinized because of the lack of direct democratic controls. The
inherent power determination is further complicated by the fact that regardless of general limitations on courts' use of their inherent powers, no exact
test exists to determine the validity of the purported use of inherent power.
C.

Case Law

The preceding discussion provides an introduction to the federal rules,
particularly Rules 1, 16, and 83, and courts' inherent power. The following
discussion focuses on some of the relevant case law. The decisions discussed
below provide insight to the current dispute regarding courts' proper role in
promoting nontraditional settlement techniques pursuant to Rule 16 and on
their inherent power. While the decisions do not directly address the issue
faced by the Seventh Circuit in Heileman they do provide analogous situations in which courts have determined the scope of Rule 16 as it relates to
settlement and judicial involvement during the pretrial stage.
In In re LaMarre,'0 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that a district
court had the authority to require a party's'012 attendance at any pretrial
session to explain his position regarding settlement, so long as the judge
deemed the party's presence to be necessary. 103 Although the Sixth Circuit
recognized that due process requirements prohibited the district court from
compelling settlement, the Sixth Circuit believed that "LaMarre could not
°4
•..refuse a lawful order to attend such a conference to discuss the matter."

101. 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974). LaMarre worked as the claims manager for Insurance
Company of North America (INA), which had insured the defendant, and was principally in
charge of INA's defense of the case. Immediately prior to trial, counsel for each side appeared
to have agreed on a settlement figure. LaMarre, however, refused his counsel's recommendation.

The court then requested that LaMarre attend a conference to explain his position. LaMarre
refused this and three subsequent court requests. The court then ordered the United States
Marshall to compel Larmarre to appear. Id. at 755.
102. The court found that LaMarre was a "party" to the proceeding, even though Michigan
law prohibited naming an insurance company a party defendant. The court reasoned that the
insurance company was, in reality, a party because it had retained counsel, was prepared to
defend the suit, and was in complete control of the negotiations. Id. at 756.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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In a situation similar to LaMarre, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky in Lockhart v. Patel,'5 held that it had the authority
to compel the attendance of attorneys, parties, and insurers at a settlement
conference and to require those parties to have the power to settle within a
set range. 0 6 In Lockhart, the district court relied primarily upon Rule 16(f)
noting that it encourages forceful judicial management. 0 7 The Lockhart
court also stressed the need for having such power, stating that "the drafters
of the amended Rule 16 knew of the docket pressures, and knew that to
process 400 cases you have to settle 350."01 Moreover, it noted that "in-

novative measures are necessary to fulfill the court's duty to provide a just
and speedy disposition of every case."' 9 Thus, the court concluded that
while a district court cannot require settlement, it can require the party "to
make reasonable efforts, including attending a settlement conference with
an open mind."" 0
Other courts have advocated the Lockhart court's notion of forceful
judicial management. For example in Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
v. Carey-Canada,"' the District Court for the District of Minnesota held

105. 115 F.R.D 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987). See also Van Bronkhorst v. SAFECO Corp., 529 F.2d
943, 951-52 (9th Cit. 1976) (district court order requiring General Counsel or someone with
authority to bind the EEOC to appear before the court and show cause why it should not
execute Consent Decree was proper use of the court's inherent authority and Rule 83); Dvorak
v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608, 609-10 (D. Neb. 1988) (Rule 16 authorizes court to compel
represented party's presence at settlement conference).
106. Lockhart, 115 F.R.D at 45-46. There, the defendant's insurance carrier was willing to
settle a medical malpractice claim for $125,000. The plaintiff demanded $175,000. The district
court ordered the attendance of both the defendant's attorney and a representative of the
insurance company's home office who had authority to "enter into a settlement in this range."
Id. at 45. The court admonished the defense attorney: "Tell them not to send some flunky
who has no authority to negotiate. I want someone who can enter into a settlement in this
range without having to call anyone else." Id. A local adjuster attended the settlement conference
for the insurance company and advised the court that she had authority to settle the case for
$125,000 and that any higher figure would be unacceptable. The trial court found that the
insurance company had deliberately failed to obey the court's order, struck the defendant's
pleadings and declared him in default. The court further stated that the trial set for the next
day would be limited to damages and a contempt hearing. Id. The insurance company settled
before the hearing for $175,000 and purged itself of contempt by writing a letter of apology
to the court. Id.
107. Id. at 46. The court stressed the following language in Rule 16(0: "if a party or party's
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or party's
attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge upon motion or his own initiative, may
make such orders with regard thereto as are just." Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988). The case involved an asbestos claim in which plaintiff
sought compensatory and punitive damages of $48 million. All parties concurred that a summary
jury trial would be useful for settlement purposes. Later, the parties wavered, objected to the
summary jury trial, and requested the magistrate to excuse their participation. The request was
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that in light of both a court's inherent power to manage and control its
docket and Rules 1, 16, and Local Rule 3,1 2 the court possessed the authority
to compel attendance and participation in a summary jury trial."I3 The CareyCanada court reasoned that Rule 16's obvious goal was to promote case
management, of which settlement played a great role." 4 Thus, the district
court found that compelling participation in summary jury trials furthered
Rule 16's underlying objectives." 5 The court also cited to local Rule 3 and

federal Rule 1, both of which it believed provided further support for its
position.

116

denied. Id. at 603-04.
Each party objected to the summary jury trial because it was estimated that it would cost
each party $50,000. Id. at 604. Also, the parties contested that the summary jury trial would
not be an accurate synopsis of a jury trial because several major evidentiary rulings would not
be made until after the summary jury trial. Finally, the parties believed that settlement was
extremely remote. Id.
112. Local Rule 3 provided that:
Each judge may prescribe such pretrial and discovery procedures as the judge may
determine appropriate . .. [and] each judge on their own initiative, on motion of
any party to an action, or by stipulation of the parties may order the attorneys and
the parties to appear for a pretrial conference to consider the subject specified in
FED. R. Civ. P. 16 or other matters determined by the judge.
Id. at 607.
113. Id. at 604 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). Summary jury trials
involve an abbreviated trial before a judge or magistrate and an advisory jury. The jury renders
a nonbinding 'decision after hearing an expedited presentation of the case, which usually lasts
less than a day. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGES 7 (P. Harter ed. 1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES].
For a discussion of summary jury trials see Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Committee On The Operation Of The Jury System, reprinted in 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984)
[hereinafter Lambros, Summary Jury Trial]; Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary
Settlements, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1363 (1984) [hereinafter Lambros, Judge's Role]; and Posner,
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986).
114. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 607. The court recognized that the Supreme Court had
acknowledged the importance of a district court's power to control and manage its docket. Id.
at 604 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). The court further believed it was
reasonable "to require the parties to engage in settlement efforts with some degree of intensity."
Id.
115. Id. at 607. Moreover, the court stated: "[ilt is hard to imagine that the drafters of the
1983 amendments actually intended to strengthen courts' ability to manage their caseloads while
at the same time intended to deny the court the power to compel participation by the parties
to the litigation." Id. The court also relied on the fact that the Judicial Conference's final
resolution, which endorsed the use of summary jury trials, deleted a phrase which would have
required voluntary participation. Id.
For similar cases finding authority to compel participation in summary jury trials, see McKay
v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) and Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone,
119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
116. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 606-07. See also Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers
to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129, 131 (1971) (Rules 1, 16, and 83 provide basis
for district court judge's authority to require parties to attempt to reach settlement).
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The Carey-Canada court also noted policy considerations, stressing the
importance of having the authority to compel the parties to engage in a
summary jury trial. The court believed that summary jury trials served as
useful settlement tools which saved the parties expenditures and conserved
judicial resources." 7 The court further argued that courts need "to compel
the parties to address settlement" in order to effectively manage their
dockets."'
20
In contrast,119 the Seventh Circuit ruled in Strandell v. Jackson County,1
that neither Rule 16 nor the inherent power doctrine authorized a district
court to compel a litigant to engage in a summary jury trial.' 2' In Strandell,
the Seventh Circuit stated that a court could only exercise its inherent power
to control and manage its docket if such use was in harmony with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22 The court further refined its pronouncement to mean that when "the Supreme Court and the Congress, acting
together, have addressed the appropriate balance between the needs for
judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant, innovation ...
must conform to that balance."'' 3 Thus, the Seventh Circuit deemed it
necessary to interpret the scope of Rule 16 as it related to mandatory
summary jury trials.
The court held that compelling parties to engage in a summary jury trial
would be inconsistent with Rule 16 and therefore, constituted an invalid use

117. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 604. The court rejected any notion that summary jury
trials were inconsistent with Rule 16's underlying goals. Furthermore, the court found that
summary jury trials posed no risk to a party's right to trial since courts could not force
settlements. Id. at 606. Lastly, the court rejected any notion that a compelled summary jury
trial was invalid because it required disclosure of discovery otherwise unobtainable. Id. It
stressed that "[tirial by ambush is no longer an accepted method of practice." Id.
118. Id.
119. The Carey-Canada court expressly refused to follow Strandell v. Jackson County, 838
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 605-06.
120. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). For differing views of Strandell, compare Mattingly,
Compelled Participation in Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases, KY. L.J. 421 (1989)
(criticizing the Strandell decision) with Maatman, The Future Of Summary Jury Trials in Federal
Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988) (agreeing with the
Strandell decision).
121. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. The district court had held that Rule 16 provided courts
with authority to compel a summary jury trial. Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333,
334-35 (S.D. Ill. 1987). The court reasoned that a resolution adopted in 1984 by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, in its original draft, endorsed summary jury trial "with the
voluntary consent of the parties," even though the resolution's final draft omitted this phrase.
Id. at 334. Furthermore, the district court relied on 16(a)(l) and (5), and 16(c)(7) and (11). Id.
The district court also noted that the trial was expected to last five to six weeks, that the parties
were poles apart in terms of settlement, and that summary jury trials had been used with great
success in similar situations. Id. at 334-35.
122. Strandell, 838 F.2d. at 886.
123. Id. at 886-87. The court stressed that the rules are a product of a careful process
designed to take "due cognizance both of the need for expedition of cases and the protection
of individual rights." Id. at 886.
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of the court's inherent power. Further, it stated that while Rule 16 was
intended to foster settlement, it was not intended to require an unwilling
litigant to be sidetracked from the normal course of litigation. 24 The Seventh
Circuit also noted that the drafters admonished using the pretrial conference
as a means of imposing settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants. 25 The
Strandell court further determined that this interpretation of Rule 16 was
consistent with other Seventh Circuit opinions.' 26 Therefore, it concluded
that compelling litigants to engage in a summary jury trial would usurp the
balance that the Rule 16 drafters struck between judicial efficiency and the
27
rights of individual litigant's.
Finally, in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 21 the Supreme Court discussed
courts' inherent authority to promulgate a procedural rule which reached
beyond the clear language of a federal rule of civil procedure. In Link, the
Supreme Court held that a district court had the inherent authority to dismiss
a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute, notwithstanding the fact that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 29 only authorized defendants to move
for such dismissals. 30 The Court determined that courts' sua sponte authority
was a long-standing, well-acknowledged power and had "long gone unquestioned."'' Therefore, the Court required "a much clearer expression of
purpose" than set forth in Rule 41(b) before it would abrogate this established judicial authority. 32
The above-mentioned cases addressed the proper role to be played by
courts in the promotion of nontraditional settlement techniques pursuant to

124. Id. at 887.
/
125. Id. It stressed that "[w]hile the drafters intended that the trial judge 'explore the use
of procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute'-including 'urging the litigants to
employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse,'-they clearly did not intend to require
the parties to take part in such activities." Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Id. See also Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Systems, Inc., 560 F.2d 298, 30102 (7th Cir. 1977) (Rule 16 does not provide authority to order party to undertake discovery
and extent of court's power is to compel a party to consider the possibility of conducting
discovery) (emphasis added); J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp.,
542 F.2d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1976) (Rule 16 does not provide authority to compel parties to
stipulate to facts to which they could not voluntarily agree).
The Strandell court recognized the even though these decisions were issued prior to 1983,
nothing in the amendments was intended to make Rule 16 coercive. 838 F.2d at 888.
127. Id. The Seventh Circuit also found that a mandatory summary jury trial would disrupt
the balance of well-established rules concerning discovery and work-product privilege. It reasoned that the national rulemaking process provided a "carefully-created balance" between the
needs for pretrial disclosure and party confidentiality and that mandatory summary jury trials
were also inconsistent with these rules. Id.
128. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
129. Rule 41(b) states, in pertinent part: "[flor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against the defendant." FED. R. Crv. P. 41(b).
130. Link, 370 U.S. at 630. Cf. Peckham, supra note 35, at 790 (Link "initially set the tone
for the extremely deferential attitude of the appellate courts toward the district courts' authority
to use pretrial procedures to 'achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."').
131. Link, 370 U.S. at 631.
132. Id. at 631-32.
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Rule 16 and their inherent power. While some cases have given great deference to courts and allowed them to compel attendance of individuals at
pretrial conferences to discuss settlement, others, such as Strandell, have
rejected this notion as inconsistent with Rule 16 and courts' inherent authority. It is in light of this tension that this Note turns to a discussion of
Heileman.
II.

G.

HEILEMAN BREWING CO. V. JOSEPH OAT CORP.

In Heileman, ' the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a district
court judge or magistrate could compel a represented party to attend a
pretrial settlement conference and require that party to have full settlement
authority. In addressing that issue, the court found it necessary to interpret
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular Rule 16, and district
courts' inherent power to control and manage their docket.
Originally, the federal District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
found that Rule 16 authorized a district court to compel a represented party
with full settlement authority to attend a pretrial settlement conference. 3 4
On appeal, a panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that neither Rule
16 nor courts' inherent power authorized such a practice.'35 The Seventh
Circuit sitting en banc reversed the panel decision.
A.

Facts and Procedure

In Heileman,3 6 a federal magistrate'37 ordered Joseph Oat Corporation
("Oat") to send a "corporate representative with full authority to settle"' 38

133. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
134. 107 F.R.D. 275, 277 (W.D. Wisc. 1985).
135. 848 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (7th Cir. 1988).
136. G. Heileman Brewing Company hired RME Associates, Inc., to construct a waste water
treatment plant at Heileman's LaCrosse, Wisconsin brewery. RME later
contracted with Joseph
Oat Corporation ("Oat") to design, engineer, construct, and test the system. Oat was the
exclusive licensee in the United States for the system's developer, N.V. Centrale Suicker [sic]
Maatschappij ("CSM"), a Dutch corporation. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,
107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wisc. 1985).
A contract dispute arose among Oat, Heileman, and RME. In December, 1982, Oat sued
Heileman and RME in a federal diversity action in New Jersey, and RME counterclaimed.
After the case was transferred to a federal district court in Wisconsin, RME joined CSM as a
third party defendant. On the same day, Heileman filed an action in Wisconsin state court
against Oat and RME, and RME cross-claimed against Heileman. Id.
Heileman and Oat agreed to withdraw all claims against each other, and Oat additionally
dismissed its complaint against RME. Thus, the remaining claims in the lawsuit consisted only
of RME's claims against Oat and CSM. Id.
137. The district court had designated a magistrate to hear pretrial matters pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1976).
138. The following facts preceded the magistrate's order. First, the magistrate had ordered
a settlement conference for December 14, 1984. The magistrate's order stated, inter alia, "[in
addition to counsel, each party shall be represented at the conference by a representative having
full authority to settle the case." Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1417. Oat's counsel, John Possi,
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to a pretrial settlement conference in Madison, Wisconsin.3 9 Oat's counsel
appeared and was accompanied by Oat's outside corporate counsel from
Philadelphia.' 40 The outside corporate counsel was authorized to speak on
behalf of Oat's senior executives, who had instructed him to inform the
magistrate that Oat was not willing, at that time, to pay any money to
settle. 14' Deciding that Oat had violated his order, the magistrate sanctioned
Oat pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) and ordered Oat to
pay $5,860.01 which represented the costs and attorneys' fees of the opposing
42
parties attending the conference.
The district court upheld the sanctions, relying on Rule 16.'14 Chief Judge
Crabb noted that the clear intent of the 1983 amendment to Rule 16 was to
provide courts with the tools required to manage their caseloads effectively

appeared on behalf of Oat, while Mr. Joseph McMahon, an independent adjuster, appeared
on behalf of National Union Fire Insurance Co. ("National"), Oat's liability insurer. The
magistrate, "apparently miffed" upon learning that neither Messrs. Possi nor McMahon had
the authority to pay any money to settle, excluded Possi and McMahon from the December 14
discussions. Id.
After that day's settlement discussions ended, the magistrate continued the conference until
December 19. The magistrate ordered each party, including RME's and Oat's liability insurers,
to send a representative with "full authority to settle the case." Id.
139. Possi spoke with John Fitzpatrick, Oat's outside corporate counsel in Philadelphia,
subsequent to the December 14 order but prior to the December 19 settlement conference. The
two interpreted the magistrate's December 14th order "to require that someone other than trial
counsel (either Fitzpatrick or one of Oat's officers) attend the December 19 conference on Oat's
behalf." Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1417.
The magistrate reduced his December 14 order to writing on December 18. It stated, in part:
2. In addition to counsel, each party and the insurance carrier of plaintiff Oat
and defendant RME, shall be represented at the conference in person by a representative having full authority to settle the case or to make decisions and grant
authority to counsel . ...
3. The attention of the parties and their counsel is directed to Rule 16, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly subparagraphs (c) and (f) thereof.
Id. at 1418. The written order did not reach the offices of Oat's attorney until Possi was
already at the conference. Id.
140. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
141. National (Oat's insurance carrier) informed Oat that it would not pay any money to
settle the case and that it would not attend the conference. Thus, Fitzpatrick believed that Oat
could not pay any money to settle the case.
Prior to attending the conference on December 19, Possi attempted to contact the magistrate
to determine if it was necessary to have someone from Oat travel from Philadelphia to Madison
to attend the conference, given that Oat could not pay any money. Heileman, 848 F.2d 141718.
The magistrate's secretary or clerk told Possi, "[t]he magistrate stands by his order. He
expects someone from Joseph Oat to be at that conference." Possi relayed this message to
Fitzpatrick who discussed the matter with Oat's vice president. Fitzpatrick was authorized to
travel to Madison to attend the conference and inform the court that Oat was not willing at
that time to pay any money to settle. Id. at 1418.
142. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
143. Heileman, 107 F.R.D. at 277.
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one such tool included a productive settlement confer-

ence. 14 The court found that a settlement conference attended by parties
who had did not have authority to settle could not be productive. Stressing
the important policy considerations at issue, the court noted that "it [was]
a misuse of . . . [public] resources for any party to refuse even to meet
personally with the opposing party or its counsel to attempt to resolve their
disputes prior to trial.' 46 Thus, Judge Crabb concluded that Rule 16 au-

thorized district courts, in appropriate circumstances, to require a represented
party to attend a settlement conference and to possess full settlement authority. 147
48
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Rule 16, on its face, did not authorize a
court to compel a client who has full settlement authority to attend a pretrial
settlement conference. 49 Rather, the Seventh Circuit believed that Rule 16's

plain language led "to the opposite conclusion."' 50 The Seventh Circuit
further held that any reliance on courts' inherent power to manage a docket

was misplaced and the district court's holding was inconsistent with Rule

16's carefully struck balance between judicial efficiency and litigants' rights. 5'
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that attendance of a
represented party who has full settlement authority at a settlement conference
was necessary for productive settlement conferences,' 52 recognizing instead
that other effective case management tools were available.' 53 Furthermore,

144. Id. at 277. Judge Crabb adopted the magistrate's conclusions of law, holding that the
1983 amendments, particularly 16(a)(5) and 16(c)(7), provide that facilitation of settlement is
an appropriate pretrial function. This view is reinforced by the advisory notes. Id. at 280.
145. Id. at 277.
146. Id. CSM, RME, and Heileman eventually settled. After RME assigned its claims against
Oat to Heileman as part of the settlement, the magistrate substituted Heileman for RME in
the proceedings. Later, after the magistrate entered sanctions against Oat but before the district
court affirmed that order, the district court dismissed CSM with prejudice pursuant to the
terms of the settlement. Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1418.
147. Heileman, 107 F.R.D. at 281. The court further stated that:
Rule 16 is a hollow authority indeed if the power is lacking to require the presence
at [a settlement] conference of the parties themselves. Only in that way may
proposals and counter-proposals be advanced and responded to without delay. The
presence of the parties, who are, of course, the most familiar with their claims and
the nature of their businesses, also opens opportunities to explore the existence of
other common grounds for agreement which may involve matters outside the
litigation.
Id. at 281.
148. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988). Judge
Manion wrote the opinion and was joined by Judge Easterbrook. Judge Flaum dissented.
149. Id. at 1419-20.
150. Id. at 1420.
151. Id. at 1421.
152. Id.
153. Id.These alternatives included urging the parties to resolve their disputes outside the
court room, conducting settlement conferences with the represented parties on a voluntary basis,
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the court noted that litigants hired lawyers to take advantage of their training
54
and skill, which includes evaluating the case and advising on settlement.
Judge Flaum dissented.' He believed that in appropriate circumstances
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized district courts to require
represented parties to attend pretrial settlement conferences. 5 6 In addition
to relying on Rule 1'17 and Rule 83,158 Judge Flaum relied on the 1983
amendments to Rule 16.119 He believed that the "clear import" of the
amendments was to provide courts with a means to effectively and actively
manage their "ever burgeoning caseloads."' 6 He also found that the amendments encourage settlement and that Rule 16 was specifically designed to
provide the necessary tools for docket management. 6' Therefore, Judge
Flaum would have upheld the sanctions.
A rehearing, before an en banc Seventh Circuit, was granted on July 22,
1988.
B.
In a 6-5 decision,

1

62

The Majority Opinion

the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc reversed the panel

sanctioning parties and attorneys who litigate frivolously or vexatiously, dismissing cases for
failure to prosecute, and setting aggressive time limitations for the parties, including pushing
the case to trial. Id. at 1421-22.
154. Id. at 1422. The panel opinion recognized Heileman's contention that attorneys may
"filter" information but did not find this to be a concern. Rather, it reasoned that part of an
attorney's job is to separate the "wheat from chaff." Furthermore, the court believed that an
attorney had a strong self-interest, which included being sued for malpractice, and duty to
realistically convey to the client a case's strengths and weaknesses. Id. at 1422.
155. Id. at 1423 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
156. Id. Judge Flaum reiterated the magistrate's words that "[t]he authority to convene a
settlement conference under Rule 16 is a hollow authority indeed if the power is lacking to
require the presence at the conference of the parties themselves." Id. (citing Heileman, 107
F.R.D. at 281).
157. Rule I requires the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED.
R. Ctv. P. 1. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
158. Rule 83 allows courts to regulate their practice and promulgate local rules. FED. R.
Civ. P. 83. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
159. Heileman, 848 F.2d.

160. Id.
161. Id. Judge Flaum relied on Rules 16(a)(5) and 16(c)(7) as examples. Rule 16(a)(5) makes
facilitating settlement an express objective of Rule 16, while Rule 16(c)(7) provides that the
possibility of settlement may be a subject discussed at a pretrial conference. He also noted that
the drafters of the 1983 amendments, as demonstrated through 16(f), endorsed forceful judicial
management and open-minded participation by the litigants. Id.
Judge Flaum also reiterated Judge Crabb's contentions that a party who refuses to meet
personally with the opposing side to discuss the possibility of settlement misuses an expensive
public resource and that settlement conferences are often unproductive if none of the parties
present have full authority to settle. Id. at 1423. Therefore, both Judge Flaum and Judge Crabb
believed that depriving courts of this authority would remove one of their most valuable docket
management tools-"the ability to conduct productive settlement conferences." Id.
162. The opinion was written by Judge Kanne, who was joined by Chief Judge Bauer and
Judges Cummings, Wood, Jr., Cudahy, and Flaum. The dissenters included Judges Posner,
Coffey, Easterbrook, Ripple, and Manion.
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decision. 63 The majority segregated its opinion into three distinct issues.
First, it considered whether a federal district court possessed the authority
to compel a represented party to attend a settlement conference and require
that party to have full authority to settle the case.1 6Finding such a power
existed, the court next considered whether the district court abused its
discretion in exercising this power.' 65 Finally, the court determined whether
the district court abused its discretion when it entered sanctions against
Oat. 166

With respect to the first issue, the majority held that a federal district
court has the inherent authority to compel a represented party who has full
67
authority to settle the case to appear at a pretrial settlement conference.
In making this determination, the majority dismissed a Rule 16 analysis on
the grounds that Rule 16 merely refers to the participation of attorneys and
pro se litigants. The court concluded that "Rule 16 does not give any direction
who are repre...upon the issue of a court's authority to order litigants
68
sented by counsel to appear for pretrial proceedings."'

The majority turned instead to an inherent power analysis, noting that
"the mere absence of language in the federal rules specifically authorizing
or describing a particular judicial procedure should not, and does not, give
rise to a negative implication of prohibition.' ' 69 Moreover, the majority
stated that district courts have the inherent power to create procedural
techniques designed to preserve the efficiency and integrity of the judicial
process so long as that power was "exercised in a manner that [was] in
harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'

170

The majority held that compelling a represented party who has full settlement authority to attend a settlement conference was not inconsistent with
Rule 16.' 11 The majority reasoned that Rule 1 requires the federal rules to
be liberally construed to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'

1

72

Furthermore, the court interpreted Rule 16's

purpose as "broadly remedial, allowing courts to actively manage the preparation of cases for trial. ' ' 73 Thus, the majority concluded that allowing
district courts to order represented parties to appear at pretrial settlement

163. 0. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
164. Id. at 650-53.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
P. 83).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

653-55.
655-56.
653.
651.
652 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) and FED. R. Civ.

170. Id. at 652 (quoting Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1988)).
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)

("[D]eposition-discovery rules are to be accorded broad and liberal treatment.").
173. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652 (quoting In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984)
(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985)).

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 39:931

conferences "merely represents another application of a district judge's
inherent authority to preserve the efficiency, and more importantly the
integrity, of the judicial process" in furtherance of Rule 16's purpose and
intent.' 7 4 Therefore, the magistrate's order was a proper exercise of the
district court's inherent authority.
The majority then addressed and rejected Oat's contention that the magistrate abused his discretion in issuing the order. 7 1 With respect to Oat's
first argument, the majority held that the magistrate neither coerced
settlement 76 nor imposed settlement negotiations on Oat.177 The magistrate's
order requiring "corporate representatives with authority to settle" to attend
a pretrial settlement conference meant that the corporate representative was
"required to hold a position within the corporate entity allowing him to
speak definitely and to commit the corporation to a particular position in
the litigation."''1 7 The majority stressed that "authority to settle" did not
mean that the representatives had to attend the settlement conference willing
to settle. Rather, the order merely required the represented party to attend
and consider the possibility of settlement. 79 Therefore, the magistrate's
actions were not coercive. The majority also found that the magistrate's
order did not impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants.8 0 The
majority found a distinction between being required to attend a settlement
conference and being required to participate in settlement negotiations.,8t
Thus, the majority found it an appropriate practice to require a corporate
representative to propose terms of settlement before a judge or magistrate
at a pretrial settlement conference.

174. Id.
175. Id. at 655.
176. The court noted that in addition to not being permitted to coerce settlement, a court
cannot compel parties to stipulate to facts. Id. at 653 n.8 (citing J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v.
Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1322 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)).
Similarly, a court cannot compel litigants to participate in a nonbinding summary jury trial.
Id. (citing Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1988)). Likewise, a court
cannot force a party to engage in discovery. Id. (citing Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification
Sys. Inc., 560 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1977)).
177. 871 F.2d at 653. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 16 states that "[a]lthough it
is not the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it
is believed that providing a neutral forum for discussing [settlement] might foster it." FED. R.
Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences).
178. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653.
179. Id. The majority quoted Judge Crabb who had stated previously in Heileman, 107
F.R.D. 275, 276-77 (1985):
There is no indication ... that the magistrate's order contemplated requiring Joseph
Oat . . .to agree to any particular form of settlement or even to agree to settlement
at all. The only requirement imposed by the magistrate was that the representative
[of Oat Corporation] be present with full authority to settle, should terms for
settlement be proposed that were acceptable to [Oat Corporation].
Id.
180. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653.
181. Id.
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With respect to Oat's second argument that the magistrate abused his
discretion, the majority held that the magistrate's order was not unduly
burdensome. 8 2 The majority recognized that circumstances could arise which
would make the appearance of a represented party at a pretrial settlement
conference clearly onerous and unproductive, or expensive in relation to the
size, value, and complexity of the case. 83 Recognizing that "all parties stood
to incur substantial legal fees and trial expenses,'

'8 4

the majority, therefore,

concluded that the benefits to be gained from the settlement conference
outweighed the burden of requiring a corporate representative to attend the
pretrial conference and thus did not constitute an abuse of discretion.'85
Finally, with respect to the third issue, the majority held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Oat.8 6 It determined that
Oat was well aware of what the magistrate expected, and was thus properly
sanctioned pursuant to Rule 16 (f).187
C. The Dissents
1. Judge Posner's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Posner found that the "narrowly 'legal' considerations bearing on the question whether district courts have the power asserted
by the magistrate in this case [were] sufficiently equivocal to authorizeindeed compel-us to consider the practical consequences for settlement
before deciding what the answer should be."' 88 Judge Posner articulated two

182. Id. at 654. Oat argued that since its business represented a going concern, it was
unreasonable for the magistrate to require Oat's President to leave the business in New Jersey
to travel to Wisconsin, and that the expense and burden to comply with the order as unduly
burdensome. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The majority referred to the fact .that the litigation involved a claim for $4 million
and turned on complex factual and legal issues. Id.
185. Id. The majority also noted that it was difficult to see how the expense that would have
been incurred to fly Oat's President from New Jersey greatly exceeded the expense incurred to
fly Mr. Fitzpatrick from Pennsylvania. Id.
Furthermore, because Oat never objected to the terms of the magistrate's order, it "was left
with only one course of action: it had to comply fully with the letter and intent of the order
and argue about its reasonableness later." Id. at 654-55 (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 656.
187. Id. at 655-56.
188. Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner found the problem "a difficult one."
He believed that nothing in Rule 16 or in any other rule or statute conferred upon courts a
power to compel clients to attend pretrial settlement conferences with settlement authority.
Furthermore, Judge Posner feared such authority would foster judicial high-handedness and
provided an example of such, citing a Seventh Circuit incident between a district court judge
and Acting Secretary of Labor Brock.
In that scenario, the district court judge ordered Mr. Brock to appear before him for
settlement discussion on the day he was to appear before the United States Senate for his
confirmation. Judge Posner believed this incident exemplified the possible judicial abuse in
ignoring the value of other people's time. He noted that people hire layers to economize on
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reasons for deciding the case on narrower grounds than the majority.8 s9
First, he believed that there was insufficient information regarding the
consequences of compelling a represented party to a settlement conference.
Second, he found that the magistrate clearly abused his discretion. 190 Thus,

for Judge Posner it was unnecessary to decide the critical issue of the
magistrate's authority.
With respect to the second issue, Judge Posner found that the magistrate
had abused his discretion, reasoning that compelling a represented party with
settlement authority to attend a settlement conference would be defensible
only if the litigants had a duty to bargain in good faith. 191 He noted that
no such duty exists. Thus, once the magistrate was made aware of Oat's
position to not settle on any terms that required it to pay money, his
continued insistence became "arbitrary, unreasonable, willful, and indeed

petulant.'192
In light of the insufficient evidence concerning the consequences of compulsory attendance at pretrial settlement conferences and the magistrate's
unreasonable actions, therefore, Judge Posner would have vacated the mag-

istrate's sanctions.
2. Judge Coffey's Dissent
Judge Coffey dissented from the majority's view on the grounds that Rule
16 "mandate[d] in clear and unambiguous terms that only an unrepresented
party litigant and attorneys may be ordered to appear" at a pretrial confer-

ence. 193 Therefore, it could not further Rule 16's intent to require a repre194
sented party to appear at a pretrial settlement conference.

their own investment of time in resolving disputes. Indeed, he pointed out that Oat was a
defendant in this case and did not want its executives' time occupied with the instant litigation.

Id.
Nevertheless, Judge Posner recognized that such a practice might serve as a necessary and
valuable management tool. He noted attorney abuse and crowded federal dockets and that Rule
16(a)'s purpose is to prepare for trial. Therefore, it was not necessary to infer that the draftsmen
meant to forbid the summoning of represented parties for purposes of exploring settlement.
Judge Posner cautioned, "[wie should hesitate to infer inadvertent prohibitions." Id.
189. Judge Posner stated that the majority's underlying concern was that the panel opinion
had stripped district courts of a valuable settlement tool which was necessary in light of the
unwillingness or inability of attorneys in conveying adequate information regarding settlement.
Id. at 657.
190. Id. at 657-58.
191. Id. at 658. Judge Posner distinguished the magistrate's demand from one which would
require a represented party who had not closed the door to settlement to send an executive to
discuss possible terms. Id.
192. Id. Judge Posner also recognized that the magistrate's demand might have required Oat
to ship its entire board of directors to Madison. Id.
193. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
194. Id.
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Judge Coffey held that the majority improperly extended courts' inherent
authority, by disturbing Rule 16's delicate balance.1 95 He noted that Rule 16
is a "product of a careful process of study and reflection designed to take
'due cognizance of both of the need for expedition of cases and the protection
of individual rights. ' "1

96

Judge Coffey commented that the Rule's drafters,

the Supreme Court, and Congress had addressed the appropriate balance for
Rule 16 in 1983, deciding to add only unrepresented parties, and not represented parties to the group of persons that a district court could require
to attend a pretrial conference. 197 Therefore, he concluded that the majority
improperly relied on courts' inherent authority to support its decision because
the majority's holding was otherwise inconsistent with Rule 16.
Judge Coffey believed that the majority's expansion of courts' inherent9
authority also contravened Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
He explained that Rule 45 authorized the issuance of subpoenas for hearings
and trials but not for pretrial conferences. 99 Furthermore, the judge raised
a due process concern because a district court's order to attend a pretrial
conference was not subject to a motion to quash as was a subpoena .2z ° Thus,
an unwilling litigant had no means of challenging the court's use of its
alleged inherent power.
Finally, Judge Coffey indicated numerous problems that would arise from
the majority's holding. He stated that the authority to compel represented
parties to attend settlement conferences would "continue to pose substantial
invitation for judicial abuse." ' 20 ' He warned that "[olur trial judges must

never fall prey to becoming part of a process that even subliminally suggests

195. Id. at 658-59. Judge Coffey referred to numerous cases that limited courts' use of their
inherent power. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (1988)
("The balance struck by [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)] between societal costs and
the rights of the accused may not casually be overlooked because a court has elected to analyze
the question under the supervisory [or inherent] power."); United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d
325, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985) ('Inherent authority' is not a substitute for good reason .. . [it]
is just another name for the power of courts to make common law when statutes and rules do
not address a particular topic."); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) ("Even a
sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional
or statutory provisions").
196. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 659 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (quoting Strandell v. Jackson County,
838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1988)).
197. Id. at 659-60. Judge Coffey noted that courts have "historically assumed that Congress
intended what it enacted." Id. at 660 (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
Judge Coffey also pointed to the consistent distinction in Rule 16 between represented and
unrepresented parties. Id. at 660. See generally supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text
(comparison of various distinctions between represented and unrepresented parties in Rule 16).
198. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 660 (Coffey, J.,dissenting). Rule 45 allows the issuance of
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, production of documentary evidence, taking of
depositions, and hearings or trials. FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
199. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 661.
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a pressure to forego the essential right of trial. ' 20 2 Furthermore, Judge
Coffey foresaw a risk that a represented party might make a damaging
admission at a pretrial settlement conference that had not been elicited in
prior discovery proceedings.2 °3
Most important to Judge Coffey, however, was his fear that the judiciary's
appearance of impartiality would be sacrificed if a litigant were forced to
sit at a "command appearance before a judge who injects himself into an
adversarial role. ' '2°4 He stressed that "the appearance of fairness, impartiality
and justice is all imperative" if judges were "to maintain the appearance of
fairness and impartiality that is so important to the preservation of confidence
' 20 5
and respect for our cherished judicial system.
3.

Judge Easterbrook'sDissent

Judge Easterbrook viewed the Heileman case as presenting three logically
separate issues: first, whether a district court may demand the attendance
of someone other than the party's counsel of record; second, whether the
court may insist that this additional person be an employee rather than an
agent selected for the occasion; and third, whether the court may insist that
the representative have "full settlement authority." 2°6 He conceded that even
if the first issue were answered affirmatively, it did not follow that the

202. Id. As an example of such potential abuse, Judge Coffey referenced the incident involving
the Secretary of Labor that Judge Posner had referred to earlier. See id. at 657 (Posner, J.,
dissenting). Judge Coffey quoted the trial court, which had sought to compel the attendance
of the Secretary of Labor to discuss settlement after the Department of Labor's attorney refused
to agree to a settlement proposal suggested by the district court:
I will tell you now that I am through with the Department of Labor's waltzing
around, taking ridiculous positions, and saying that this is the Government. The
Government is the Secretary of Labor, so far as I'm concerned. And I want to see
him at 10:00 o'clock on the 23rd of April in this courtroom to tell me why the
Secretary of Labor is taking these idiotic positions.
No. 85-1640, unpublished order at 2-3 (7th Cir. Apr. 23, 1985), reprinted in Heileman 871 F.2d
at 661 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
203. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
204. Id. Judge Coffey stated:
We may express in grandiose terms all sorts of theory and postulation about being
careful not to influence, intimidate and/or coerce a settlement, but under the
pressure that our trial judges experience today from their ever-burgeoning caseloads,
we would be foolhardy not to anticipate an undesirable and unnecessary psychological impact upon the litigant in circumstances of this nature. The difficulties
associated with active judicial participation in settlement negotiations is expressly
exacerbated when the trial is scheduled before the court rather than a jury of one's
peers. The appearance of partiality and impropriety must be avoided at all lengths
if our nation is to continue to show respect for its judicial judgments.
Id.
205. Id.
206. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 663. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook believed
"full settlement authority" to mean the "authority to agree to pay cash in settlement." He
was uncertain, however, whether this meant "authority without cap." Id.
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20 7
second and third powers existed or that the magistrate had acted prudently.
Addressing the second issue, Judge Easterbrook was puzzled that a magistrate could require a corporation to send an employee rather than a
representative to a pretrial conference. He noted that corporate "employees"
are simply agents of the firm, and an agent's authority depends on which
powers the corporation chooses to bestow on the agent. Judge Easterbrook
also referred to the common use of outside attorneys as negotiators. Thus,
he found it understandable that Oat preferred to send a skilled negotiator,
20
rather than its management team, to explore settlement. 1
Judge Easterbrook also took exception to the majority's conclusion that
Oat was merely required to attend the settlement conference and not negotiate. He concluded that the magistrate abused his discretion by attempting
to "facilitate settlement then and there.' '209 He believed that Oat was charged
with contempt because its representative did not command the company's
treasury, 21 0 and the magistrate was afraid that he "might say something like
21
'I'll relay that suggestion to the Board of Directors,' which might say no."
Judge Easterbrook stated, "[w]e close our eyes to reality in pretending that
Oat was required only to be present while others 'voluntarily' discussed
settlement.' '212
Judge Easterbrook, like Judge Posner, stressed that civil defendants have
no legal obligation to bargain in good faith. 213 He criticized the majority as
authorizing a power "unknown even in labor law, where there is a duty to
bargain in good faith," since negotiators in labor disputes generally have
the authority to discuss but not to agree. 21 4 Therefore, he found it impermissible to require a defendant, who has no legal duty to negotiate in good
faith, to attend a settlement conference with the authority to settle then and
there, especially since this authority was not required even of labor and
21 6
union agents 21 5 who do have a legal obligation to bargain in good faith.

207. Id. at 663.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 664. This, according to Judge Easterbrook, was evidenced by the fact that the
magistrate, upon learning that Fitzpatrick did not have the authority to make a monetary offer,
ejected him from the conference even though Fitzpatrick claimed to have authority to speak
for Oat. Moreover, the magistrate ejected Fitzpatrick without listening to what he had to say
on Oat's behalf or learning whether Fitzpatrick would be receptive to the others proposals. Id.
211. Id. at 665.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 664. Judge Easterbrook noted that a defendant who is convinced it did no wrong
may insist on total vindication. Id. (citing Hess v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.,
846 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1988)). He further stated that Rule 16 clearly was not intended to require
parties to have authority to settle the litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's
note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences) (reference to "authority" in final
sentence of subsection (c) does not mean attorneys must have authority to settle the case).
214. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
215. Judge Easterbrook rejected the notion that settlement of civil litigation is more valuable
than the settlement of labor disputes. He believed that the statutory requirement, which compels
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Judge Ripple's Dissent

Judge Ripple dissented 2 7 and wrote separately only to emphasize what in
his view was "the most enduring-and dangerous-impact of the majority's
opinion." ' 28 He opined that the "broad, amorphous, definition of the 'inherent power of a district judge' violated the premise of the Rules Enabling
Act 2 9 and "[blefore long . . .[would be] used to justify far more questionable 'innovations.' 2 2 0 He believed that the Rules Enabling Act was designed
to foster a uniform system of procedure throughout the federal system which
could be supplemented, but not altered by local rules designed to address
local concerns. 22 ' Therefore, Judge Ripple viewed the majority's decision as
the first significant step in encouraging "the individual district court to
22 2
march to its own drummer.
5. Judge Manion's Dissent
Judge Manion believed that Rule 16's language excluded any use of
inherent power by a court to order represented parties to attend pretrial
settlement conferences.2 23 He stated that the purpose of courts' inherent

parties to a labor dispute to bargain in good faith, and the absence of such a legislative
command for civil litigants, implied that the opposite was true. Id.
216. Id. Judge Easterbrook also raised a more pragmatic argument. He held that the
magistrate's order required either: (1)changing the allocation of responsibility within the
corporation; or (2) sending a quorum of Oat's Board of Directors. He reasoned that while
most corporations provide their senior managers with the authority to agree, as distinct from
the power to discuss, this case involved a $4 million claim. Moreover, the authority to settle
for such a great sum would generally require the approval of a corporation's board of directors.
Therefore, the magistrate's order required a quorum of the board of directors to attend the
settlement conference or a change in allocation of power within the corporation. Id.
Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook noted that while reallocation of authority might not appear,
on its face, to cause many problems, such problems do exist. Id. at 665. For example, the
United States Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division has authority to settle, but only
up to $750,000, while the Deputy Attorney General has the authority to settle for higher sums.
Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.160(a)(2), 0.161). The issue then becomes whether the magistrate can
compel the Deputy Attorney General to attend a settlement conference or require a delegation
of this authority. Id. Judge Easterbrook concluded that if the delegation would be improper
for the Department of Justice, the delegation should be improper as it related to Oat. Id.
217. Judge Ripple joined the dissenting opinions of Judge Coffey and Judge Manion.
Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658 (Ripple, J., joining in Judge Coffey's dissent); id. at 666 (Ripple,
J., joining in Judge Manion's dissent).
218. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
220. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665-66 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 665. Judge Ripple noted that Congress recently expressed its concern with district
courts frustrating the careful process of evaluation, which the Rules Enabling Act requires, by
invoking a proliferation of local rules. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988), cited in Heileman 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple,
J., dissenting).
222. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
223. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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authority was to fill gaps in the law, and when a statute or rule specifically
addressed a particular area it was inappropriate to invoke the courts' inherent
authority to overstep the bounds of that statute or rule.224 Judge Manion
concluded that both the Rule's text and advisory notes prohibited the majority's invocation of inherent power. Like Judge Coffey,22 he stressed the
language of Rule 16(a) 22 6 and Rule 16's consistent distinction between represented and unrepresented parties. 227 Judge Manion also found the Advisory
Committee's Notes supportive of his position. 22s Thus, any use of inherent
power here failed.

Judge Manion also warned that the "substantial costs" which arose from
the majority's decision outweighed its benefits.2 29 He reiterated Judge Pos-

ner's concern of judicial high-handedness and stressed Judge Coffey's concern that federal courts' appearance of fairness and image of providing a
neutral form were essential to the proper functioning of the courts. Further,
he recognized a third cost, that of "denigration of the attorney's role in
litigation. ' 230 Finally, Judge Manion also observed that the majority's hold-

224. Id. (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2373-74 (1988)).
225. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
226. Rule 16(a) defines who the court may require to appear at and participate in a pretrial
conference. See generally supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 16(a)).
227. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting). Judge Manion also pointed to Rule
16(f) which allows for sanctions if "no appearance is made on behalf of a party." Id. (emphasis
in original). He also refused to disregard the drafters language as a result of "sloppy draftsmanship." Id. at 668. Judge Manion thought the distinction in the Rule consistent with a
litigant's statutory right to representation by an attorney. Id. at 667 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(1982)). Also, he found the distinction consistent with the attorney's traditional role in litigation.
Id. See also id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting) (litigants hire attorneys "to economize on their
own investment of time in resolving disputes" and to take advantage of an attorney's training
and skill).
Judge Manion recognized that lawyers sometimes convey inadequate information regarding
settlement; he noted, however, that a lawyer has a strong self-interest and ethical duty to relay
accurate settlement information. Id. at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 668-69. He focused upon the drafters' statement that, "it is not the purpose of
Rule 16(b)(7) to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants [instead] it is believed
that providing a neutral forum for discussing the subject might foster it." Id. at 669 (citing
FED. R. Crv. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Scheduling and Planning)). Judge Manion also
noted that "Rule 16 'was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from
the normal course of litigation."' Id. at 669 (quoting Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d
884, 887 (7th Cir. 1988)).
He rejected the majority's distinction between "being required to negotiate" and "being
required to attend." He reasoned that the magistrate clearly required the represented party to
attend the conference, state his position regarding settlement, and listen to other parties, perhaps
including the court's proposals. Thus, Judge Manion found the magistrate was requiring the
parties to discuss settlement. Id. Moreover, he reasoned that even if a distinction can be found
between "discussion" and "negotiation," the kind of coerced participation here was close
enough to forced negotiation to come within the advisory committee proscription. Id. at 66970.
229. Id. at 670.
230. Id.
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ing would effectively impose litigation expenses on litigants that they had
attempted to avoid in the first instance by hiring an attorney. 23I
Judge Manion rejected the majority's underlying premise that the necessity
of effective docket management justified its holding. He indicated numerous
alternatives which he believed would effectively deal with litigants who
"unreasonably refuse to settle.'' 23 2 He also stated that courts have substantial
power to punish frivolous litigation and undue delay through aggressive
scheduling techniques and Rule 11, and he recognized "the time-honored
'233
method of pushing cases to early trials.

111.

ANALYSIS

The Heileman opinion presents two issues worthy of discussion: first,
whether the majority properly interpreted the law involving Rule 16 and
courts' inherent authority; and second, whether policy considerations justified the majority's legal analysis. This Note contends that the majority erred
in cursorily analyzing Rule 16's text and advisory notes and in disregarding
the earlier view set forth in Strandell. Perhaps more significantly, however,
the majority erred in extending the boundaries of courts' inherent authority.
Finally, it will be argued that the majority could have adequately addressed
the policy considerations presented by the Heileman case with a more narrow
and less restrictive holding.
A.

The Majority's Legal Analysis

1. Rule 16 Analysis
The majority failed to properly interpret Rule 16 in light of its text and
the Advisory Committee's Note. In interpreting Rule 16, the Seventh Circuit
was faced with four alternatives. Rule 16 could be viewed as either: (1)
authorizing the magistrate's actions; (2) prohibiting the magistrate's actions;
(3) providing some insight as to the question presented; or (4) failing to
provide an answer to the issue. The Heileman majority determined that the
last alternative was appropriate. It opined that Rule 16 did "not give any
direction to the district court upon the issue of the court's authority to order
litigants who are represented by counsel to appear for pretrial proceedings. ' 23 4 The majority argued that Rule 16(a) only requires attorneys and

231. Id.
232. He noted procedures such as judgment on the pleadings, Rule 12(b) dismissal, and
summary judgment. Id.
233. Id. Judge Manion also distinguished In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974). He
found LaMarre inapplicable because "it simply does not address whether Rule 16, as it now
stands, limits the district court's power to order represented parties to appear at settlement
conferences." Heileman, 871 F.2d at 671 (Manion, J., dissenting).
234. 871 F.2d at 651 (en banc) (emphasis added).
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unrepresented parties to attend pretrial conferences. 2 5 The majority further
stated that "the mere absence of language in the federal rules specifically
authorizing or describing a particular judicial procedure should not, and
does not, give rise to a negative implication of prohibition. ' 23 6 Thus, in
concluding that Rule 16 provided no direction regarding the issue before it,
the majority catapulted itself into the murky waters surrounding courts' use
of their inherent power to determine the validity of the magistrate's order.
A closer analysis of Rule 16's plain language and its underlying purposes
would have precluded an inherent power analysis.
While the majority failed to adequately analyze the scope of Rule 16 in
light of its language and advisory notes, the dissenters scrutinized the rule.
Therefore, the dissents' arguments that Rule 16's scope does not authorize
compelling represented parties with full settlement authority to attend pretrial
conferences will be briefly reiterated here as a premise upon which to build.
Before 1983, Rule 16 provided district courts with the authority to compel
attorneys to attend pretrial conferences. In 1983, the drafters explicitly
provided district courts with the added ability to require "unrepresented
parties" to attend pretrial conferences.2 3 7 There is no mention anywhere,
however, of the drafters' intent to provide courts with the authority to
compel represented parties to attend pretrial conferences.2 3s Additionally, the
dissenters noted that Rule 16 consistently distinguishes between "represented" and "unrepresented" parties.23 9 These reasons support the proposition that the 1983 drafters desired that district courts not have the authority
to compel represented parties to attend pretrial conferences.
The dissenters also found support in other advisory comments for this
contention. The drafters designed Rule 16 to provide neutral forums to foster
settlement in the pretrial context. 240 Further, the dissenters noted that Rule
16 was not meant to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants 24'

235. Id.
236. Id. at 652 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) and FED. R. Crv.

P. Rule 83). Judge Manion argued that the majority read Link too broadly. Id. at 667 n.l
(Manion, J., dissenting). Judge Manion argued that Link did not hold that negative implication
is always an inappropriate interpretation tool. While negative implication might not by itself
conclusively answer what the exact scope of a particular rule is, it furnished a good starting
point. Id.
The majority's reliance upon Rule 83, arguably, also proves too much. As pointed out above,
Rule 83 drafters did not intend its language to have the expansive interpretation that the
majority bestowed upon it. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
237. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a).
238. The drafters added unrepresented parties, according to Judge Coffey, only after the
"the Supreme Court and Congress took a good hard look at Rule 16 in hopes of improving
judicial efficiency." Heileman, 871 F.2d at 659-60 (Coffey, J.,dissenting).
239. Id. (Coffey, J.,dissenting); id. at 667-68 (Manion, J., dissenting).
240. FED. R. Crv. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences) (emphasis added). See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 661 (Coffey, J.,dissenting). The majority avoided this argument by drawing a
distinction between negotiation and attendance. As Judge Manion indicated in his dissent,
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and it was "dead set against any coercive settlement practices. ' 242 Thus,
both the text and advisory notes support the proposition that Rule 16 does
not provide district courts with the authority to compel represented parties
to attend pretrial conferences.
Further, in determining that Rule 16 did not provide any direction to the
issue at hand, the majority disregarded the earlier, and better view set forth
in Strandell. There, the Seventh Circuit held that district courts lacked the
inherent authority to compel litigants to participate in a nonbinding summary
jury trial. 243 Heileman, on the other hand, held that district courts have the
inherent authority to compel a represented party who has full settlement
authority to attend a settlement conference. 2"
The decisions are difficult to reconcile. A summary jury trial, like a
pretrial settlement conference, serves as a means to facilitate settlement. 24
In some respects, however, a summary jury trial is less intrusive to litigants'
rights than a mandatory settlement conference. For example, a summary
jury trial is nonbinding and affords the parties time to consider a jury's
holding. 246 In contrast, any decision made in a pretrial settlement conference
is binding. Furthermore, the determination of an appropriate settlement
figure or assessment of damages at the pretrial conference is not determined
by a disinterested jury, but rather by parties who have a significant, and in
some districts, perhaps an overbearing interest in seeing the case settled.
Moreover, an active judge may afford a represented party little time to
thoroughly contemplate a settlement offer. By requiring the represented party
to have full settlement authority, the court effectively places the primary
responsibility of determining the propriety of a settlement offer in the hands
of the client, a situation which in many cases, can result in an inadequate
and unjust result. Additionally, the risk of offending a judge may be quite
great. And, in certain circumstances, a represented party who is unfamiliar
with judicial settlement techniques may be overwhelmed and thereby forced
to accept what he or his attorney may otherwise believe to be an imprudent
offer. 247 These concerns, on the other hand, are not present with compulsory
summary jury trials.
however, the distinction is specious:
It appears that the court is saying that a district court may order a represented
party to appear in court both to talk and listen about settlement-in other words,
to actually discuss settlement. I cannot see any meaningful distinction between this
kind of activity and 'negotiation;' after all, negotiation in large measure simply
involves discussion.
Id. at 669 (Manion, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
242. Id. at 669 (Manion, J., dissenting).
243. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1988).
244. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 887.
245. See Lambros, Judge's Role, supra note 113, at 1375 (summary jury trial was designed
to foster Rule 16(c)(7)'s mandate, which encourages extrajudicial procedures to foster settlement
and resolve disputes).
246. See HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, supra note 113, at 7.
247. See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
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Any contention that summary jury trials involve unique concerns regarding
premature disclosure of discovery must fail. Just as the Strandell court
expressed concern regarding the revelation of privileged information during
the summary jury trial, 248 there is a similar risk that a represented party may
during the settlement conference
inadvertently reveal damaging information
249
that was previously undisclosed.
Furthermore, any contention that Strandell, unlike Heileman, risks infringing a litigant's right to a jury trial fails. The risk of infringing upon a party's
right to a jury trial is greater with mandatory settlement conferences. While
a jury renders its decision in a summary jury trial after hearing evidence
produced during a simulated trial,25 0 in contrast, no jury determination exists
ofwith mandatory settlement conferences. Additionally, pretrial settlement
251
fers may be made without knowledge of all the facts and evidence.
The Heileman decision also fails to acknowledge Strandell's articulation
of the nature and scope of Rule 16. In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit
determined that Rule 16 was not coercive in nature. While recognizing that
Rule 16 was intended to foster settlement, the Seventh Circuit also noted
that "it was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked
from the normal course of litigation.

'25 2

Moreover, Rule 16 required pretrial

conferences to be "neutral forum[s]" in which to facilitate settlement, 253 and
it "was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties-or one of theminto an involuntary compromise.

'25 4

Finally, the court found that while Rule

16 encourages courts to explore innovative procedures,2 5it does not mandate
that parties be required to engage in such procedures.
The majority in Heileman, however, ignored these admonitions. Oat was
not provided with a neutral forum; 2 6 in fact, the pretrial settlement conference could well be categorized as coercive. The magistrate's actions demonstrate that the risk of clubbing a party into involuntary compromise is

248. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988).
249. Judge Coffey commented that "among other problems, the litigant [may] make an
admission of some type which would be damaging to the case and which had not previously
been elicited in discovery proceedings." Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
250. See HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, supra note 113, at 7.
251. See JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 2, at 76 n. 17 ("Overzealous judges may exercise undue
influence on a final settlement, often without adequate knowledge or understanding of the facts
of the case."); Elliott, supra note 10, at 317 ("It seems beyond serious debate, then, that
discretionary managerial decisions may influence the outcome of litigation in ways that are
arbitrary because judges act without . . . procedural safeguards").
252. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
253. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note).
254. Id. (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
255. Id. (emphasis in original).
256. Oat had no intention to settle. Indeed, its insurance carrier made clear its intention not
to attend the settlement conference. Therefore, the principals of Oat felt they could not settle
even if they had wanted to. Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1417-18. See also id. at 662 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting) (doubting that a litigant would not feel pressured if forced to sit before a judge
"who injects himself into an adversarial role").
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actual in the context of mandatory settlement conferences.25 7 Therefore, the
Heileman majority also erred by advocating a potentially coercive procedural
innovation, purportedly in furtherance of Rule 16's spirit and intent, but in
direct contradiction to the court's discussion in Strandell.
While it is true that the 1983 amendment to Rule 16 was designed to
increase judicial management and control over pretrial activities, the Rule
also was meant to prevent overstepping by the courts. The advisory notes
28
are replete with warnings and limitations regarding judicial overreaching.
It is also recognized that Rule 16 is not coercive in nature and strikes a
careful balance between judicial efficiency and litigants' rights. 2 9 Requiring
parties to attend pretrial settlement conferences against their will and requiring them to possess full settlement authority oversteps these limitations.
Even if one accepts the contention in Heileman that Rule 16 does not
prevent a judge from compelling a represented party to attend a pretrial
settlement conference, the majority erred when it also required the repre-"
sented party to have full settlement authority. Rule 16 provides that full
settlement authority is not required for pretrial conferences. The final sentence in Rule 16(c) 260 was added to prevent pretrial conferences from becoming mere "ceremonial or ritualistic event[s]. ' ' 261 The drafters stated:
The reference to "authority" is not intended to insist upon the ability to
settle the litigation. Nor should the rule be read to encourage the judge
conducting the conference to compel attorneys to enter into stipulations
or to make admissions that they consider to be unreasonable, that touch
on matters that could not normally have been anticipated to arise at the
conference, or on subjects of a dimension that normally require prior
consultation with and approvalfrom the client.2
While the drafters' statement only discusses settlement authority for attorneys, it does signify the drafters' belief that full settlement authority was
not necessary for effective case management. Thus, the majority's rationale
that authority to settle is necessary for meaningful settlement conferences
2 63
directly contradicts the drafters' intent and belief.

257. See id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J.,dissenting) (magistrate's desire to settle the case "then
and there"); id. at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting) (after Oat informed magistrate it did not wish
to settle, magistrate's "continued insistence on Oat's sending an executive to Madison [was]
arbitrary, unreasonable, willful, and indeed petulant").
258. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
259. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886-87.
260. This sentence reads, "At least one of the attorneys for each party participating in any
conference before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions
regarding all matters that the participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed." FED.
R. Civ. P. 16(c).
261. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences).
262. Id. (emphasis added).
263. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner stated that the
core of the majority's decision was the concern for "meaningful settlement conferences." Id.

1990]

G. HEILMAN, INC. v. JOSEPH OAT CORP.

971

The advisory comment above, also indicates that the drafters desired
attorneys to report back to their clients regarding subjects "of a dimension
' 64
that normally require consultation with and approval from the client. '2
Thus, the majority's dismay with the delay inherent in such a process 265 did
not trouble the drafters, Congress, or the Supreme Court, and therefore, is
also contradictory to Rule 16's clear language and intent.
In sum, the majority in Heileman failed to interpret properly the purpose
and policy underlying Rule 16. Such an analysis would have demonstrated
that Rule 16 does address and prohibit a magistrate from compelling a
represented party with full settlement authority, against his will, to attend a
pretrial settlement conference. Furthermore, Rule 16 explicitly rejects the
notion that full settlement authority is required to conduct a meaningful
pretrial conference. Even if one accepts the majority's position regarding
Rule 16, however, the decision still fails because its reliance on courts'
inherent authority was misplaced.
2.

Inherent Power Analysis

The Heileman majority's own articulation of courts' inherent power fails
to support its holding. The majority merely stated in a conclusory fashion
that its reliance on courts' inherent power was proper because it furthered
Rule 16's spirit and intent by promoting pretrial efficiency and judicial
integrity. 266 The Heileman holding neither promotes efficiency nor judicial
integrity and, indeed, the decision may cause the opposite result.
The majority articulated the well-established limitation that a court's use
of its inherent power, in a civil procedural context, must be exercised "in a
manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

' 267

Thus, any procedural technique, promulgated pursuant to a court's inherent
26
power must preserve the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process. 1
The majority's application of this limitation, however, fails.
Judge Posner stated that "[s]ome district judges and magistrates distrust the willingness or
ability of attorneys to convey to their clients adequate [settlement] information . .. [which] is
what lies behind the concern that the panel opinion has stripped the district courts of a valuable
settlement tool." Id.
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences).
265. The majority speaks generally of efficiency. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652 (en banc). A
more explicit articulation concerning the delay inherent in attorneys reporting settlement information back to their clients after pretrial conferences can be found in the lower court's decision.
See Heileman, 107 F.R.D. at 277.
There, Judge Crabb opined "[a] settlement conference without all of the necessary parties
present is not productive. Neither is a conference of persons who have no authority to settle."
Id. at 277. Only in that way may proposals and counter-proposals be advanced and responded
to without delay." Id. at 281. See also Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1423 (Flaum, J., dissenting)
(settlement conferences without parties are "often unproductive").
266. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652-53.
267. Id. at 652 (quoting Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1988)).
268. Id. at 651.
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In applying this limitation, the majority held that compelling the attendance of a represented party who had full settlement authority furthered
Rule 16's spirit, intent, and purpose, premising its argument by stating that
Rule 1 requires the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to be liberally construed
269
to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
The majority then stated that Rule 16's "spirit, intent, and purpose" was
broadly remedial.270 It also argued that the "entire thrust of the amendment
.. . was to urge judges to make wider use of their powers and to manage
actively their dockets from an early stage." 27 ' Therefore, the court concluded
that compelling a represented party's attendance and requiring that party to
have full settlement authority was "merely . . . another application of a
district judge's inherent authority to preserve the efficiency, and more im' 272
portantly the integrity, of the judicial process.
The majority neglected to point to any evidence to support its conclusion
even though it had an obligation to do So. 73 A closer analysis by the majority
would have revealed that the magistrate's purported use of inherent authority
was inconsistent with Rule 16.
2

a.

Insufficient evidence

The primary goal of the Rule 16 drafters was to promote active case
management. 274 To accomplish this goal the drafters displaced attorney
control over the pretrial process. 275 The drafters desired that district courts
control the speed at which cases would be tried, rather than attorneys, who

269. Id. at 652 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
270. Id. (citing In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1014 (1985)). The majority also cited Baker for the proposition that "the spirit and
purpose of the amendments to Rule 16 always have been within the inherent power of the
courts to manage their affairs as an independent constitutional branch of government." Id.
(quoting Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("Because inherent
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and
discretion."). See also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 81, at 1022-23 ("The accumulated
weight of repetition behind such a phrase as 'inherent power' of the lower Federal courts is a
constant invitation to think words instead of things. It is imperative, therefore, to subject it to
critical scrutiny.").
274. Rule 16 advocates "judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase." FED.
R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee's note (Pretrial Conferences; Objectives). See Schwarzer,
supra note 39, at 402 (judges should intervene in civil litigation and actively manage it from
the time of filing).
275. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652. ("[T]he entire thrust of the amendment to Rule 16 was
to urge judges to make wider use of their powers and to manage their dockets from an early
stage."). See also JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 2, at 66. ("The basic tenet of case management
philosophy is that the court, not the attorneys, should control the progress of cases in the
pretrial period."). See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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often abused the process. 276 Therefore, the majority correctly held that any
use of inherent power, to be consistent with 277Rule 16, must preserve the
efficiency and integrity of the pretrial process.
Nevertheless, the Heileman majority pointed to no evidence that would
indicate that its holding would preserve pretrial efficiency. 7 In his dissent,
Judge Posner recognized the majority's lack of support and stated that, "we
have insufficient information about those consequences to be able to give a
confident answer." 2 79 Furthermore, the existing empirical evidence regarding
extensive judicial participation in civil case settlement, which the majority's
holding implicitly advocates, 2 0 indicates that it is nonproductive.2 11 One study
states:
Those courts that exert the most effort in settling cases do not necessarily
dispose of more cases per judge than those courts where less judicial
settlement effort is expended. The only obvious relationship ... is the
perfect inverse relationship between amount of court settlement activity
time. The most settlement-intensive courts are the
and median disposition
2 82
slowest courts.

276. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (requiring a scheduling order from the court). Cf. JUSTICE
supra note 2, at 40 ("Civil case management is most in evidence in the federal courts
Elsewhere the pace of litigation
and its effect there on the pace of litigation is pronounced ....
is left almost entirely in the hands of the attorneys.").
277. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652. This articulation justifies treating cases such as In re
LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974), and Van Bronkhorst v. SAFECO Corp., 529 F.2d 943
(9th Cir. 1976), differently from the Heileman case. In both LaMarre and Van Bronkhorst,
the courts were presented with a situation where one party, the claims manager or EEOC,
unreasonably refused to state its reasons for refusing a settlement offer that was otherwise
acceptable to the primary parties involved. Thus, these parties were attempting to abuse the
pretrial process. In contrast, in Heileman the primary party, Oat, in good faith, did not want
to settle and desired a trial upon the merits. This has never been considered an abuse of the
pretrial process. Therefore Heileman is distinguishable from LaMarre and Van Bronkhorst. See
Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1422 (distinguishing LaMarre because, among other things, it represented
an "extraordinary situation").
278. Unfortunately, the day has not arrived "when courts and legislatures . . . regularly turn
to empirical research to answer questions" related to pretrial. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at
viii.
279. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657-58 (Posner, J., dissenting). See also Resnik, supra note 10,
at 417-24 (examination of available information reveals little support for proposition that
judicial management is responsible for efficiency gains, if they even exist, and instead intimates
that purported gains are illusory).
280. The extensive nature of settlement activity that the majority condones was reflected in
the magistrate's actions. The magistrate spent a great amount of time with the parties and
engaged in two settlement conferences. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 655-56.
Moreover, if a party has authority to settle, there will be a natural predisposition to engage
in active discussion over the prospect of settlement, certainly more extensive than if the party
had no settlement authority. Indeed some judges separate the parties and discuss settlement
with each one individually.
281. See, e.g., JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 2, at 31-33, 75-76.
282. Id. at 33.
DELAYED,
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While the authors of this study stated that they were not in a position to
assert a causal connection, they did note that "fast courts on civil case
'28 3
processing need not be 'settling' courts.
Another study found that limited judicial participation in settlement may
be valuable but "a large expenditure of judicial time is fruitless. ' 28 4 Yet
another study revealed that, "[a] court with lengthy procrastination of most
cases, but few ultimately going to trial, could absorb more total judge time
than a court having more cases going to trial but with the pretrial settlements
'
being achieved quickly and with little expenditure of judge time." 285
Thus,
not only is it questionable whether increased judicial involvement in civil
case settlement promotes efficiency, there is empirical evidence indicating
the opposite to be true.
b.

Compromising judicial integrity

More importantly, perhaps, is the majority's contention that its holding
will preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Preservation of judicial
integrity does not necessarily follow from increased efficiency, even assuming
that such would occur. A concern focused primarily on speedy dispositions
can lead to injustice. As one commentary stated, "[a] sacrifice of justice to
obtain speedy dispositions could hardly be termed a reform. ' 28 6 Moreover,
Rule 1 does not equate justice with efficiency; instead it requires a just and
28 7
speedy determination of every action.

The majority's holding "compromises, rather than furthers, the 'protect[ion of] the integrity of the court.' 288 It is well established that respect
for the judicial system is dependent upon the "appearance of fairness,
impartiality and justice. ' 2s9 Commentators have noted that judicial abuses

283. Id. The authors of this study questioned whether settlement conferences actually lower
the proportion of cases that require trial. Furthermore, they stated, "even if conferences do
settle cases that would otherwise have resulted in trial, it is not clear that a change in trial
utilization will necessarily increase total court output." Id. at 76. Cf. Peckham, supra note 35,
at 778 (recognizing "a point of diminishing returns is reached when the time and expense saved
by pretrial is less than the time and expense spent on it").

284. See S.

FLANDERS,

supra note 2, at 37.

285. See Gillespie, The Production of Court Services: An Analysis of Scale Effects and Other
Factors, 5 J. LEOAL STUD. 243, 254 (1976).
286. See JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 2, at 65; Link v. Wabash R.R. 370 U.S. 626, 648-49
(Black, J., dissenting) ("When we allow the desire to reduce court congestion to justify the
sacrifice of substantial rights of the litigants ... we attempt to promote speed in administration,
which is desirable, at the expense of justice, which is indispensable to any court system worthy
of its name.").

287.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 1.

288. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662 n.4 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 748 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
289. Id. at 662. See also Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The guiding consideration is that the administration of justice should reasonably
appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact."); See also Comment, State Court Assertion
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and coercive activities during pretrial settlement conferences do exist. 29°
Moreover, as Judge Coffey commented:
We may express in grandiose terms all sorts of theory and postulation
about being careful not to influence, intimidate and/or coerce a settlement,
but under the pressure that our trial judges experience today from their
ever-burgeoning caseloads, we would be foolhardy not to anticipate an
undesirable and unnecessary psychological impact upon the litigant .... 291
The majority's failure to provide for procedural safeguards exacerbates

the concern that the majority's holding will compromise the integrity of the
judicial process. Authorizing settlement conferences to be attended by represented parties who have full settlement authority, without providing pro2 92
cedural safeguards, will encourage arbitrary judicial activities and decisions.
One risk is that judges or magistrates who lack full knowledge of all the

issues, may pressure a represented party to accept an inadequate settlement

of Power to Determine and Demand its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 1205 (1972)
("Public willingness to accept and abide by court decisions depends, in large measure, upon
the court's reputation as a fair and disinterested tribunal. Thus a court should seek to avoid
involvement in situations where even the possibility of partiality on its part might be suggested.").
Additionally in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 156, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1973),
the court, in recognizing courts ability to grant a pretrial protective order, warned:
[T]he concept of implied and inherent powers poses great dangers when, of necessity,
their definition and application is in the hands of those who wield them ....
If,
through lack of restraint and by attempting to increase their powers unnecessarily,
they lose the respect which makes them effective, they may soon find that, as. a
practical matter, even powers that are now conceded to them, are unenforceable.
Id.
290. The dissents referred to the incident that involved the Secretary of Labor. Heileman,
871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 661 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judicial abuse
has also been cited elsewhere. One commentary states: "[slettlement activity by trial court
judges is at least susceptible to judicial abuse. Overzealous judges may exercise undue influence
on a final settlement. . . . Such judges have tools to influence, even coerce, a settlement
agreement that may violate procedural and substantive standards of fairness." JUSTICE DELAYED,
supra note 2, at 76 n.17. These authors further found that attorneys who practiced in districts
that aggressively promoted settlement frequently complained that court pressure to settle was
often inappropriately intense. Id. at 32.
Another author has argued that "lu]nreported or ex parte communications do indeed provide
a temptation for abuse and, more importantly, may create the appearance or suspicion of
coerciveness." Peckham, A Judicial Response To the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253,
263 (1985). See also Resnik, supra note 4, at 552 ("The literature on judicial settlement activities
documents the subtle and not so subtle pressures asserted by judges when discussing settlement.
Some judicial 'suggestions' are understood as more than that-as implicit comments that litigants
who insist upon a trial are acting inappropriately.") (footnote omitted).
291. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
292. One author has argued, "[it seems beyond serious debate, then, that discretionary
managerial decisions may influence the outcome of litigation in ways that are arbitrary because
judges act without procedural safeguards that accompany decisions on the merits." Elliott,
supra note 10, at 317. See also Resnik, supra note 10, at 432-40 (1982) (procedural safeguards
necessary with managerial judging to protect due process concerns).
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figure early on in the pretrial process.2 93 One commentator states:
[U]nless established guidelines delineate the role of the trial judge in
settlement negotiations, the judge has the propensity to abuse his expanding
authority. Despite his best efforts to the contrary, a judge's human nature
prohibits him from remaining totally neutral and objective under the
pressure of settlement negotiations. The judge's human shortcomings are
of most concern in cases
involving unrestricted judicial involvement in
2 94
settlement proceedings.
Thus, the majority's holding presents a very real risk of tarnishing the
appearance of judicial fairness and impartiality which is crucial for the
continuing viability of the judicial system itself.
In sum, the majority failed to present any evidence to support its proposition that compelling a represented party who has full settlement authority
to attend a pretrial conference would preserve the efficiency or integrity of
the judicial system. Indeed, little evidence exists, and the empirical evidence
that is available indicates that judges who actively pursue settlement through
the use of pretrial conferences may actually hinder both efficiency and the
integrity of the judicial process. Rule 16's drafters displaced attorney control
over pretrial so as to promote judicial efficiency and integrity-that is, they
desired effective case management. Because the majority's holding does
neither, it is inconsistent with Rule 16's underlying objective. Therefore, the
majority's use of the inherent power doctrine was improper.
c.

Alternative inherent power analysis

Even if one disregards the empirical evidence regarding pretrial efficiency
as inconclusive and the concerns over judicial integrity as misplaced, the
majority's legal foundation is still specious because it neglected to examine
other established limitations on courts' inherent authority which would have
prevented its use. The Supreme Court has warned that "[b]ecause inherent
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised
with restraint and discretion." 29 This admonition, along with established
precedent, gives rise to two general limitations. First, courts should be
cautious in attempting to use their inherent power so as not to unreasonably
infringe upon litigants' rights. 296 Second, a court must demonstrate the

293. See JUSTICE DELAYED,supra note 2, at 76 n.17 ("Overzealous judges may exercise undue
influence on a final settlement, often without adequate knowledge or understanding of the facts
of the case.").
294. Comment, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 171, 190 (1985) (footnote omitted).

295. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
296. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. See also Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658-60
(Coffey, J., dissenting) (use of inherent power must not usurp carefully struck balance in Rule
16 between court efficiency and litigants' rights); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884,
886-87 (7th Cir. 1987) (same). Additionally, one court has stated:
A pre-trial conference is primarily a technique to promote the disposition of litigation
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"necessity" of using its inherent power.2 97 Case law and scholarly commentary demonstrate that courts have required different degrees of necessity to
justify different uses of inherent power.2 9 As a general rule, however, it

appears that to the extent that a court's use of its inherent power infringes
upon litigants' rights, a corresponding demonstration of "necessity" must

also be shown. 299 Not only does the majority's decision significantly infringe
upon the rights of both the hired attorney and the represented party, it also
fails to prove the degree of necessity required to justify its invocation of the
court's inherent power, because effective, less restrictive means of controlling
docket congestion exist.
Compelling a represented party who has full settlement authority to attend
a settlement conference significantly impinges attorneys' and represented

parties' rights. Not only does the majority's decision encroach on attorney
autonomy and the traditional role of attorneys, 3" it also cuts to the heart
of the adversarial system.30° As Judge Posner stated, "[o]ne reason people

hire lawyers is to economize on their own investment of time," and it is not
entirely implausible that "judges may ignore the value of other people's

time."30 Clients' rights are similarly harmed. Parties to litigation often rely
on attorneys' skill and expertise in resolving disputes. The majority's decision
requires a lay person to make a legal conclusion as to the propriety of
settlement, arguably, in a coercive atmosphere. 303 Moreover, there is a con-

by cooperation and agreement.... Yet, despite such broad powers and despite the
salutary effects of pre-trial dispositions on court dockets, the trial court must
exercise every means available to protect the rights of a litigant to have a trial on
the merits.
Schaefer v. Sippel, 58 I11.
App. 3d 816, 819, 374 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (1st Dist. 1978).
297. See supra notes 83-87, 93 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 80-90 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 91, at 351-56.
299. For example, the contempt sanction or dismissal sua sponte, while a severe infringement
upon litigants' right to a trial on the merits, is justified because courts could not possibly
function without the authority to sanction abuses of the judicial system. Without such authority,
the judicial system itself would be threatened. This concept was recognized in Eash when the
Third Circuit discussed the distinction between "functional necessity" and "necessity only in
the sense of being convenient." Eash v. Riggings Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562-64 (3d Cir.
1985) (en banc).
300. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 667, 670 (Manion, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[p]art
of an attorney's expertise includes evaluating cases, advising litigants whether or not to settle,
and conducting negotiations" and the majority's opinion "denigrat[es] . ..the attorney's role
in litigation"); id. at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the attorney does not wish to have the
litigant personally appear before the court at the pretrial conference, he is not bound to do
SO.'').

301. See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 401 (1976) (principle of adversarial relationships,
in which each party is responsible for preparing its case for trial, is basis for trial system).
302. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
303. Judge Coffey commented that litigants lack legal training and "could well be confused
and dismayed with judicial participation in settlement negotiations." Id. at 662 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting). He also feared a litigant might make "an admission of some type which would be
damaging to the case and which had not previously been elicited in discovery proceedings."
Id.
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3 °4
tinual risk of coerced settlement with few, if any, procedural safeguards.
Lastly, the decision arguably imputes a legal duty on the litigants to bargain
in good faith prior to trial.30
Since compelling a represented party who has full settlement authority to
attend a settlement conference significantly infringes upon the litigants' rights
and requires invoking courts' inherent rulemaking authority, the majority
should be required to show that the practice it advocates is more than merely
reasonably necessary. 3°0 Because well-established and effective docket management alternatives already exist, the authority to compel a represented
party who has full settlement authority to attend a settlement conference is
not necessary to the extent required to justify invoking an inherent power
analysis.
Currently, two general categories of docket management tools exist: pretrial streamlining techniques,30 7 and diversion techniques.3 0 s Streamlining procedures usually demand a firm scheduling policy, which may include strict
discovery deadlines and granting continuances of trial dates only for good
cause.3°9 Other streamlining measures include assigning cases to a mandatory
tracking system based on their complexity, 10 using mail and telephone
conferencing to expedite the processing of motions, " and penalizing parties
12
for last-minute settlements after court-rooms and juries have been assigned.
Additionally, established diversion techniques, or alternative dispute reso313
lution techniques exist.

304. See generally Resnik, supra note 10, at 432-40.
305. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 664-65 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
306. Note, supra note 91, at 353 (the use of inherent rulemaking authority should be made

"sparingly and when need is apparent and pressing").
307. See P. EBENER, COURT EFFORTS To REDUCE PRETRIAL

DELAY ix (1981).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Handbook for Effective Pretrial Procedure, reprinted in 37 F.R.D. 255, 271
(1964) ("The selection of an early trial date has proven conducive to and, for the most part,
essential to a successful pretrial conference ... for it is well known that nothing settles law
suits like setting them for trial."); Elliott, supra note 10, at 313 ("[P]erhaps the most important
single element of effective managerial judging is to set a firm trial date."); Peckham, supra
note 290, at 258 n.13 ("Firm dates motivate the parties to establish proper priorities rather
than to pursue all potential arguments."); Report to the President and Attorney General of
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, 80 F.R.D. 509,
535 (1979) ("It is desirable to establish time limits ... so that ... the litigants are motivated
to exercise self-discipline and creative choices between alternatives.").
310. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at II.
311. P. EBENER, supra note 307, at xi.

312. Id. at xi. Other alternatives include: judgment on the pleadings, Rule 12(b) dismissal,
summary judgment, voluntary arbitration, voluntary summary jury trials, and simply encouraging attorneys to engage in settlement discussions with each other. District court judges can
also request represented parties to attend a settlement conference, either in the presence of the
judge or otherwise.
313. Examples include summary jury trials, private arbitration, court-annexed arbitration,
mediation, private judging, and the mini trial. See, e.g., Lambros, Summary Jury Trial, supra
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The Heileman majority neither addressed these alternatives nor made any
showing that these alternatives were ineffective docket management tools.
Studies have revealed, and practice has demonstrated, that firm scheduling
policies are the most efficient way to control docket congestion.3t 4 Even if
a "docket crisis" does in fact exist, this does not necessarily establish that
these alternative docket management tools are inadequate. Rather, it appears
that district court judges, at least to some degree, are either unfamiliar with
all the possible alternatives available to them or are unwilling to use them.3"'
In sum, the Heileman majority's own articulation of the courts' inherent
authority does not support its holding. The majority failed to adequately
support its conclusion that its decision would preserve judicial efficiency or
integrity. As numerous studies indicate, the majority's holding may, in fact,
hinder pretrial efficiency and the integrity of the judicial process. Furthermore, the majority's holding significantly infringes upon/litigants' rights.
Moreover, because established and effective alternatives currently exist to
control crowded court dockets, the majority, arguably, did not meet the
showing of "necessity" required to justify its use of the inherent power
doctrine.
B. Policy Considerations
It would be disingenuous to focus solely on the majority's legal foundations
without also closely examining the policy considerations that the Heileman
decision presents. As the dissenting opinions indicate, the majority ultimately
appears to be concerned with the ability to hold meaningful settlement
conferences with attorneys who often are unwilling to convey to their clients
adequate settlement information. 1 6 Thus, there appears to be two general
policy concerns: (1) the ability to hold meaningful settlement conferences," 7
and (2) attorneys' unwillingness to communicate complete settlement infor-

note 113, at 482; Ready, Alternative Dispute Resolution-A Trial Lawyer's Primer, 53
COUNSEL J. 300 (1986).

INS.

For a discussion of the alternative dispute resolution movement see Lieberman & Henry,
Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986).
314. See JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 2, at 76.
315. See, e.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 66-89 (call for education and training
programs to transmit better to courts the accumulated learning on how best to reduce docket
congestion and increase judicial efficiency); JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 2, at 5, 54 (evidence
strongly suggests the "local legal culture," including courts' and attorneys' expectations,
practices, informal rules of behavior, and apathy to change causes significant delay in case
disposition).
316. Judge Posner commented, "[s]ome district judges and magistrates distrust the willingness
or ability of attorneys to convey to their clients adequate information bearing on the desirability
and terms of settling a case in lieu of pressing forward to trial." Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657
(Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Manion also noted that the majority's concern was "that to
effectively manage their case loads, district courts need the power to order represented parties
to appear at settlement conferences." Id. at 670 (Manion, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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mation. 1s This Note contends, however, that the majority had an alternative
less draconian than that of sanctioning district courts to compel represented
parties who retain full settlement authority to attend pretrial settlement
conferences.
As demonstrated above, extensive personal judicial involvement in facilitating settlement may not be desirable.?1 9 There is little, if any, evidence of
increased efficiency in requiring a represented party who has full settlement
authority to attend a pretrial settlement conference. A judge may be more
efficient by only playing a minimum role in personally overseeing and
encouraging settlement discussions. Furthermore, as Justice Clark320 warned,
there is a significant risk in making settlement the courts' overriding concern
during the pretrial process.32 Thus, the majority's concern over "meaningful" settlement conferences is misplaced.
On the other hand, the concern over attorney reluctance to relay all relevant
settlement information is valid. Nevertheless, requiring a representative party
with full settlement authority to attend a pretrial settlement conference as a
means of preventing attorney misconduct is problematic in that it will neither
promote efficiency nor preserve judicial integrity. Furthermore, requiring
full settlement authority causes definitional problems and may prove unduly
burdensome to many parties. The majority should have chosen a less restrictive alternative to protect against attorney misconduct, one consistent with
Rule 16 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A less restrictive alternative would require a client to attend the pretrial
conference, or designate another agent to represent itself, in addition to its
hired attorney. Although the client, or agent would not be required to
possess settlement authority, that person attending the conference should
have a significant self-interest in seeing the case disposed of quickly and
justly. Thus, the party must not have a financial interest in the continuance
of the case. Furthermore, any agent sent in a party's stead, must have easy
access to the ultimate decisionmaker, for instance, a vice president or inhouse counsel.
This alternative avoids many of the problems encountered when a represented party with full settlement authority is required to attend a settlement
conference. Efficiency will be preserved in that a magistrate or judge will
not be tempted to engage in extensive discussions concerning settlement
because neither party will have ultimate authority to settle. If courts are
concerned with the inherent delay arising from the relay of settlement
proposals, they can impose reasonable deadlines on the parties. The integrity

318. Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
319. See supra notes 283-91 and accompanying text.
320. See supra text accompanying note 32.
321. See Clark, supra note 30, at 167. See also Comment, Pretrial in Maine, supra note 3,

at 111 (emphasis on disposition rather than preparation in pretrial conferences may be too
strong, thereby replacing the litigation process itself by making the pretrial conference an end
rather than a means to resolve disputes).
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preserved since there is no reason to entice
of the judicial process is also
"settlement then and there. 322 The problem of imputing a new legal obligation to negotiate in good faith is also avoided. Moreover, the litigants'
rights are only minimally infringed upon. Hired attorneys might take offense,
but they still would retain ultimate control over their cases. Furthermore,
clients will only incur the added expense of sending another party to a
settlement conference. This cost is outweighed by the fact that the client can
avoid the opportunity cost of having to attend the conference personally,
and also avoid the risk of making a hurried and uninformed decision
regarding the propriety of settling its case.
While one may argue that this ideal provides no guarantee that settlement
will be entered in to, it does provide assurance that clients will receive
adequate information regarding the other side's settlement proposals. Additionally, this less restrictive approach preserves judicial integrity and efficiency by appropriately limiting the judicial role in settlement activities.
IV.

IMPACT

As already noted, Heileman imposes a potentially detrimental effect on
the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process.3 23 The Heileman decision
also significantly affects the role that judges and settlement will play in
future pretrial conferences. While the decision encourages district court
judges and magistrates to compel represented parties who have full settlement
authority to attend pretrial settlement conferences, it does little to clarify
the "new pretrial controversy" by leaving unanswered many questions regarding the proper role that judges and settlement should play in future
pretrial conferences. Furthermore, the decision fails to provide future litigants
with appropriate guidance regarding their new role. In particular, the opinion
raises two interpretive questions which will perplex both future litigants and
courts: (1) what is the exact meaning of "full settlement authority"; and (2)
who qualifies as a "represented party."
A. The Future Role of Judges
The Heileman decision clearly encourages judges to actively pursue settlement with both counsel and, in particular, clients. The decision, however,
does little to provide future judges with guidance in using their new settlement
tool of compelling represented parties to attend settlement conferences.
Moreover, while the majority attempted to establish an outer boundary that
future judges would not encroach in pursuing settlement, it is a mere skeleton
that neither provides adequate guidance to future judges nor protects future
litigants' rights.
The majority in Heileman sanctioned a new settlement tool for district
court judges but provided little instruction as to its proper use. The majority,

322. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
323. See supra notes 272-91 and accompanying text.
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however, did provide one admonition to future judges with respect to
compelling represented parties to settlement conferences. It stated that a
judge abuses his discretion if compelling a represented party to attend a
pretrial conference would be clearly onerous, unproductive or expensive in
relation to the size, value, and complexity of the case.324 This balancing test,
while providing some guidance, is likely to prove too malleable and unpredictable. More importantly, it is unclear as to how effective the test will be
in controlling the discretion of future judges and magistrates unless appellate
courts permit interlocutory appeals.3 25 A party would be unable to appeal a
magistrate's or judge's decision if it settles its case, even if the magistrate
or judge clearly violated the party's rights by compelling its attendance or
coercing settlement. Also, it is unlikely that the party would appeal its
mandatory attendance after a verdict.3 26 While a party can refuse to attend
the settlement conference and thereby appeal immediately its sanctions, this
is drastic conduct which many attorneys may not wish to pursue. Moreover,
a client might frown upon such a tactical move that might cause the client
to incur an added expense. Thus, unless appellate courts allow for interlocutory appeals, it is unclear how effective the abuse of discretion test will be.
The opinion also leaves many questions unanswered regarding the proper
role that judges and magistrates should play while engaged in settlement
conferences. The majority did attempt to provide some guidance in this
respect. Its articulated limitations provided that judges can neither compel
settlement 32 nor compel settlement negotiations.3 2 Beyond these two statements, however, the role for future judges and magistrates in settlement
conferences is undefined. The new settlement tool sanctioned by the Seventh
Circuit requires the promulgation of additional procedural safeguards in
order to control judicial discretion and protect litigants' rights and the
integrity of the judicial process. Although such safeguards may be difficult
to draft and implement, some suggestions exist. 3 29

324. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 654.
325. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides,
When a district judge . . . in a civil action . . . shall be of the opinion that [an
order not otherwise appealable] involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon,
in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order . ...
Id.
326. A party who received an unfavorable verdict would not appeal the order compelling it
to attend the pretrial conference since in all likelihood it would have little to do with the merits
of the case and would not be grounds, in the vast majority of cases, for reversing the decision.
Obviously, a party who received a favorable verdict would not appeal the order that compelled
it to attend a pretrial conference since it would be irrelevant, or harmless.
327. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653 (citing Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
328. Id.
329. See Resnik, supra note 10, at 432-33 (suggesting that settlement conferences attended
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The Future Role of Settlement

While the two limitations articulated above may help guide the future
conduct of judges, they more appropriately address the role that settlement
will play in future pretrial settlement conferences. The first limitation, that
judges cannot compel settlement, is clear and requires no comment. The
second limitation that future judges cannot compel settlement negotiations,
however, is more nebulous. Whether future courts will be able to compel
settlement negotiations is confusing because the majority articulated a distinction between being compelled to attend a settlement conference and being
compelled to participate in settlement negotiations. 3 0 It appears, however,
that the majority's opinion requires more than mere attendance. In addition
to stating that a party can be compelled to attend a settlement conference
to "consider the possibility of settlement," it also stated that the representative may be required to propose its terms of settlement in a pretrial
conference before a judge."' Therefore, as Judge Manion stated in his
dissent, "[i]t
appears that the court is saying that a district court may order
a represented party to appear in court both to talk and listen about settlement-in other words, to actually discuss settlement. I cannot see any
332
meaningful distinction between this kind of activity and 'negotiation.'
Thus, it appears that Heileman will soon stand for the proposition, if it
does not do so already, that civil litigants have a de facto, if not de jure,
obligation to bargain in good faith regarding settlement prior to trial if a
judge or magistrate so desires.
Another implication of the decision with respect to settlement is more far
reaching. The opinion, arguably, represents a major step toward what commentators have labeled as a conscious transformation of the meaning of
managerial judging. The Heileman case furthers the misconception that
managerial judging is synonymous with facilitating settlement. Commentators
have noted that the notion of managerial judging is taking a new shape.333
One commentator has stated:

by parties be on the record, ex parte communications by judge or magistrate be prohibited,
authoritative manual outlining acceptable management and settlement-inducing techniques be
created, and title 28 be amended to permit appellate review of various types of judicial
management decisions).
330. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653 (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 16, advisory committee's note
(Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences)).
331. Id. at 653-54.
332. Id. at 669 (Manion, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also id. at 664-65
(Easterbrook, J.,dissenting) (majority's opinion requires civil litigants to have greater authority
than parties to labor disputes, where there is a duty to bargain in good faith).
333. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 10, at 308 ("Originally created as a set of techniques to
narrow issues for trial, managerial judging has recently become a set of techniques for inducing
settlements."); Resnik, supra note 4, at 529 (federal judges are self-consciously shifting roles
from "adjudicator to case-manager to settler"); id. at 528 ("Many federal judges have begun
to perceive themselves as being in the business of settlement as much as (sometimes more than)
in the business of adjudication.").
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Only shortly after it achieved undisputed legitimacy, the institution of
managerial judging . . . is evolving rapidly from a set of techniques for

narrowing issues to a set of techniques for settling cases.
... What makes the shift in the functions of managerial judging
particularly interesting is that the outcome is still 'up for grabs.' In terms
of evolutionary metaphors, a new 'mutant' has just appeared on the scene,
but it is unclear whether it will die, survive, or become dominant and
crowd out its predecessors.114

Another commentator has criticized this transformation, believing it threatens
our traditional notions of due process. 35 Thus, Heileman, in addition to
affecting the future role of judges and settlement, may also impinge upon

our traditional notions of the adjudication system itself.
C. The Future Role of Litigants
In addition to affecting the role of judges and settlement, Heileman
significantly impacts upon the role of future litigants without providing
adequate guidance as to their new legal responsibilities. Two interpretive
questions, in particular, prove troublesome: (1) what is the exact meaning
of "full settlement authority"; and (2) who qualifies as a "represented
party."
1. Full Settlement Authority

While the Seventh Circuit opinion does lend some guidance with respect
to the definition of full settlement authority, this articulation is not very
helpful. The majority stated that authority to settle "means that the

'corporate representative' attending the pretrial conference [is] required to
hold a position within the corporate entity allowing him to speak definitively and to commit the corporation to a particular position in the liti-

gation. 3 3 6 This statement is ambiguous and subject to two interpretations.
An expansive view provides that the representative must have the authority to pay a cash settlement without limit. Corporate litigants, for
example, would be obligated to send a representative who had unrestrained

334. Elliott, supra note 10, at 323 (footnote omitted).
335. Resnik, supra note 10, at 430-31 (footnotes omitted). Professor Resnik states:
[T]he literature of managerial judging refers only occasionally to the values of due
process: the accuracy of decisionmaking, the adequacy of reasoning, and the quality
of adjudication. Instead, commentators and the training sessions for district judges
emphasize speed, control, and quantity. District court chief judges boast of vast
statistics .... The accumulation of such data may cause-or reflect-a subtle shift
in the values that shape the judiciary's comprehension of its own mission. Case
processing is no longer viewed as a means to an end; instead, it appears to have
become the desired goal. Quantity has become all important; quality is occasionally
mentioned and then ignored. Indeed, some commentators regard deliberation as an
obstacle to efficiency.
336. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653.
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control over the corporate treasury.337 A more restrictive reading would
require the representative to have settlement authority equal to that amount
in which the client would reasonably settle the litigation. Under this interpretation, however, a party who reasonably and in good faith has decided
not to settle must still attend the settlement conference with the authority
to settle for a certain amount. This was precisely the situation in Heileman
where Oat's representative was sanctioned for not having full settlement
authority because he only had authority to speak on behalf of the corporation and reiterate that the company was not willing to settle.338 Thus,
the majority's decision, even interpreted narrowly, requires a defendant,
who in good faith does not want to settle the litigation, to send a representative who can settle the litigation for a specific dollar amount. What
this amount should be, however, is unclear.33 9
The typical problem that will be encountered by a future corporate
litigant because of the inherent ambiguity in the definition of full settlement
authority can be illustrated best by a hypothetical. Assume that Corporation
H files suit against Corporation 0, claiming damages of $4 million. Although Corporation 0 does not wish to settle the case for $4 million, its
board of directors is willing to settle the case for $2 million. Assume further
that believing settlement would be in the best interest of the parties, a
magistrate orders that the corporations attend a pretrial settlement conference with their hired counsel and a represented party who has full settlement
3 40

authority.

Corporations O's board of directors' decision as to who to send to the
settlement conference will be greatly influenced by how much authority its
representative at the settlement conference must have. If the broad interpretation of full settlement authority applied, Corporation O's representative would be required to have the authority to settle the litigation for
$4 million. Conversely, if the narrow interpretation applied, Corporation
O's representative would be required to attend the settlement conference
with the ability to settle the litigation for $2 million. The difference is
significant because Corporation O's board may be more willing to delegate
the authority to settle for $2 million than it would for $4 million, especially
since the board has already determined that it would settle the litigation

337. Id. at 663-64 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (majority's "full settlement authority" seemed
to mean parties had "to come to court with open checkbooks on pain of being held in
contempt").
338. Heileman, 107 F.R.D. at 277.
339. This ambiguity will present important problems for future corporate litigants. Corporations must send an agent to pretrial settlement conferences since the actual party-the
corporation-is a legal fiction and obviously cannot attend the conference. Thus, a corporation's
board of directors, which ultimately possesses the authority to settle litigation on behalf of the
corporation, would presumably have to attend the settlement conference or delegate this
authority to an individual.
340. For purposes of this hypothetical assume that Corporation 0 is not insured against the
potential liability.

986

DEPA UL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:931

for $2 million. Under the broader interpretation, however, the board may
have reservations in providing one person with the authority to settle the
litigation for potentially $4 million. Theoretically, to maintain control over
the corporate purse strings, Corporation O's board might find it more
prudent to send a quorum of its members to attend the conference; such
a decision, however, would be highly unlikely. But the alternative-presumably delegating the authority to a senior executive-involves the risk
of giving one individual the important responsibility of making a command
decision regarding settlement before a magistrate or judge.3 4' Yet, not to

send either an individual or a group with the authority to settle for the
full amount could result in sanctions.
The issue of full settlement authority also raises more subtle problems.
Corporation 0 might not want to risk sanctions for sending a representative
who has authority to settle for only $2 million. Therefore, it might authorize
its agent to settle for $4 million, but explicitly direct the agent to refuse
any settlement offer requiring Corporation 0 to pay more than $2 million.
Thus, the representative would have the authority to bind Corporation 0
to a $4 million settlement, but, in fact, would not do so. It is unclear as
to how a court could sanction Corporation 0 for this type of behavior
without imposing on the entity a duty to bargain in good faith, something
the majority in Heileman denied that it was doing.34 2
2.

Represented Party

The Heileman opinion also presents another definitional problem. The
majority, unlike the situation with respect to defining full settlement authority, did not provide any guidance as to who could or could not be a
represented party. The possibilities are numerous. Corporation 0 may
desire to send its hired counsel to attend the conference with "full settlement
authority." Presumably, however, no court would allow such a manipulation of the Heileman holding, especially if the magistrate specifically
requested a represented party in addition to counsel. But the term represented party itself is ambiguous, as Judge Easterbrook pointed out in his
4
dissent .
In the aforementioned hypothetical, the defendant is a corporation.
Presumably, Corporation O's board of directors would be the ideal representative. Because in a substantial number of cases a corporation will
deem it wasteful to send a quorum of its board to a settlement conference,

341. Judge Easterbrook noted that this alternative might contravene state laws that provide
corporate boards of directors with the ultimate authority to settle litigation. Additionally, the
majority's holding might also have repercussions for the Department of Justice by requiring
the Assistant Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General to attend pretrial settlement
conferences upon demand. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
342. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653 (en banc).
343. See id. at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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the issue then becomes to whom may the board delegate this status. The
possibilities include: attorneys, either outside or in-house counsel, senior
executives, and other employees.
The majority's opinion does not expressly prohibit an outside attorney
from being a representative at a settlement conference. However, this would
3 44
denigrate the majority's concern that attorneys are often imperfect agents.
Nevertheless, if outside counsel were prohibited from acting as representatives, then, presumably, only corporations that employ in-house counsel
could attain the benefit and expertise of an attorney in pretrial settlement
conferences. In-house counsel would be more acceptable representatives
because they lack the financial interest in long, protracted cases evinced
by outside counsel. If no attorneys could qualify as represented parties,
however, one must decide who has the appropriate background in training
and skill to make such command decisions regarding settlement before a
magistrate or judge. A possible, and most likely solution is to rely on
senior executives such as the corporate CEOs, presidents, or senior vice
presidents. These people, however, while skilled professionals, may be
unfamiliar with the legal aspects of the case or with judicial settlementinducement techniques and therefore be generally unprepared to make the
best choice regarding settlement. Moreover, as Judge Posner stated in his
dissent, one reason why corporations hire attorneys "is to economize on
their own investment of time in resolving disputes. ' 3

45

Nevertheless, it

appears that both corporate litigants and other private litigants will be
obligated to make time for settlement conferences, regardless of the cost
or burden.
In sum, Heileman will have an important impact on future litigation.
The decision expands both the role that judges and settlement will have in
pretrial settlement conferences. The opinion, however, raises many questions regarding the extent that judges can partake in settlement-inducing
techniques. Moreover, the decision appears to be a significant step in the
transformation of the meaning of managerial judging. Lastly, future litigants, in particular corporations, are also affected and left with important
questions, with respect to their responsibilities, unresolved.
V.

CONCLUSION

Judges today are active managers-executives in our system of,justice.
This new status became readily apparent in 1983 when many of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular Rule 16, were substantially
amended. Today, Rule 16 advocates active case management and the
facilitation of settlement as express objectives of pretrial conferences.
Despite this guidance, however, the proper role that district court judges
and settlement play in the pretrial process is anything but settled.

344. See id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 670 (Manion, J.,dissenting).
345. Id. at 657 (Posner, J.,dissenting).
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G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp. represents an attempt to
provide direction regarding the role that settlement and the judiciary should
play during the pretrial process. The majority's conclusion to expand the
role of judges and settlement, however, is unsatisfactory. Moreover, the
majority's analysis is equally problematic. The majority concluded that it
was within a court's inherent power, in furtherance of Rule 16's spirit,
intent and purpose, to compel a represented party who has full settlement
authority to attend a pretrial settlement conference because such a practice
would preserve pretrial efficiency and judicial integrity. It is entirely likely,
however, that the decision will have an opposite result.
The majority's deferential analysis also provides dangerous precedent.
The majority's expansive use of the already nebulous inherent authority of
the courts will promote future procedural innovations in the name of
managerial judging that may well hinder pretrial efficiency and judicial
credibility, if not carefully scrutinized.
Further, the decision will have a significant impact on future litigants.
The opinion dramatically expands the role that judges and settlement play
in the pretrial process. Moreover, the majority's opinion is representative
of current courts' propensity to cling to settlement as a talisman for
managing their dockets without closely analyzing the implications that
increased settlement efforts will have on the system's efficiency, integrity,
and indeed, continued viability. Additionally, the decision leaves important
questions regarding the future role of litigants unanswered.
Without a clearer articulation than is provided in Rule 16 regarding the
meaning of "active case management," the "mutant" will continue to
evolve and grow. This unguided evolution presents problems. The issues
prevalent since the inception of the pretrial conference need to be addressed
3 46
by the Judicial Committee, Congress, and the legal community in general.
The uninformed decisions made by courts simply has proven, and will
continue to prove, too costly.
Tony J. Masciopinto

346. Compare Resnik, supra note 4, at 547 ("Given the problems of contemporary litigation,
the Rules need reworking in several respects.") with Elliott, supra note 10, at 322 (call to fill
the "gaping hole" surrounding the "essentially standardless procedures of managerial judging").
Some of these concerns include the following issues. What is the proper role of settlement in
pretrial? What does case management/managerial judging entail? Are procedural safeguards
needed/possible to prevent arbitrary managerial judging? Are there tradeoffs between efficiency
in dispute resolution and the equity of dispute outcomes, and if so, what are they? P. EBENER,
supra note 307, at xix. At what point does court intervention to expedite litigation become
court management of case development? How far should the goal of settling cases extend? Id.
at xix.

